A Note From Our President

BY MARK STOUT

My colleagues and I established the North American Society for Intelligence History (NASIH) to catalyze the creation of a community of intelligence historians in the United States and Canada. We hoped that this community would cut across a variety of disciplines. We also hoped that it would be well connected with our colleagues in Europe and elsewhere in the world, practitioners interested in history, and the museum community. We have now had our first conference, in Washington, D.C., with the generous assistance of the International Spy Museum and to Kings College London and we are off to a great start. We were delighted with the broad range of people who attended and the new professional networks that started to form right there. Though the inaugural conference was a success, it will just be the first step. Under the leadership of Dr. Sarah-Jane Corke, who will become the new President of the Society in December, we are already beginning to plan the next conference and are looking to broaden our support for this scholarly community. We could use your help in making sure that NASIH continues to flourish. If you’d like to lend a hand, please contact us.
Jumping from a CIA Plane Straight into a Firing Squad: Dutch Spies behind the Iron Curtain

BY CEE WIEBES

In October 1951, five CIA agents landed in the middle of the night with parachutes in Romania to carry out a daring secret mission. The Dutch Foreign Intelligence Service (BID) was involved in the operation, as researcher Cees Wiebes has discovered.

In 1949 the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began a secret operation in Romania, which country was then within the Soviet sphere of influence. The covert operation was meant to destabilize the communist regime in Romania. For its implementation, the CIA recruited agents amongst Romanian and Bulgarian refugees in Germany, Italy and Austria. The CIA mainly recruited men who had served in the German army, the SS, or the Gestapo during the Second World War because they needed little additional training. These agents were destined to be dropped by parachute over Romania. There they were to make contact with various anti-communist resistance groups and provide them with light weapons, ammunition, radio transmitters and medicines. The agents were given three main tasks. First, they had to urge the Romanian partisans to sabotage bridges, railways and factories. Secondly, they had to gather information about units of the Soviet Army stationed in Romania. And thirdly, they had to persuade the Romanian resistance groups to attack the Soviets in the event that an all-out East-West war would break out. But the operational execution of the plans progressed very slowly. The CIA thereupon decided that they could use some help and approached various small Western intelligence agencies to join. The Swedes, Norwegians, Danes, Greeks and Italians decided to participate but also the Foreign Intelligence Service (BID) of the Netherlands joined this daring scheme.

For a BID Spy School in Rome

In the 1950s, the CIA had a major influence on the Dutch intelligence community. The CIA financed, trained, advised and supported the BID but also the domestic security service (BVD). The CIA provided these Dutch services with money, weapons, advanced eavesdropping equipment but also carried out joint operations in the Netherlands and abroad, mainly counterintelligence operations against communist targets like diplomats and embassies. In that context, the American request to the BID was not that strange. In January 1951 the Director of the BID, A. de Muralt, was invited for a 10-day visit to Washington DC where he conferred for several days with the Director Central Intelligence, W. Bedell Smith. De Muralt and Smith agreed upon a kind of "gentleman’s agreement" and the BID decided to participate in the secret CIA operations in Romania. The deal was that the BID would run these covert operations purely as a national matter and the CIA would only provide money and planes. All the other aspects of this covert CIA-BID joint venture would be strictly under Dutch control in order to forestall leaks or communist penetrations. The BID began the covert operation by recruiting agents amongst former ‘fascist’ Romanians who were housed in various refugee camps in Italy. The service also established its own spy school in Rome.
There the Romanians were taught how to deal with clandestine transmitters, the use of codebooks and Morse code. The training was done by military officers which were all working for the Netherlands Stay Behind organization. All the time the Romanians were told that they were dealing with the CIA. The trainers and BID-officials who visited the Romanians never spoke a word of Dutch. In this way the Romanians did not know that they actually worked for the Dutch BID. After several weeks of training, the recruits were transported by car to the Netherlands, where they received additional training by military experts. They also received additional training in shooting, how to use radio transmitters and how to deal with explosives. The training probably took place in Fort Spijkerboor or Fort Edam north of Amsterdam. After two weeks, the Romanians flew from Amsterdam Schiphol airport to Munich and there they got an additional parachute training. A few weeks later they were flown back to Rome and then taken to Athens. From there, a plane operated by the CIA would drop them over Romania.

Cyanide Pill

In the night of 18 to 19 October 1951 the moment was there. Five men - Constantin Saplacan, Wilhelm Spindler, Mathias Bohn, Ilie Puiu and Adrian Gheorghe Barsan - jumped from a CIA plane. They landed safely on Romanian soil and buried their parachutes, supplies and weapons. As agreed in advance, the group immediately dispersed in order to avoid discovery. This was in vain, because soon the Romanian police and security services started to hunt down the group. This was partly due to the stupidity of group leader Saplacan, who drank too much one night and was picked up by the police. The Romanian police and counterintelligence officials soon knew everything because Saplacan confessed that he was working for the CIA. After a few weeks, the other members of the team were arrested one by one. Only one team member was not captured because he took his cyanide pill in time. He died immediately. Another team member did not manage to break the pill with his teeth and swallowed the whole pill. However, the pill was removed after surgery and he remained alive.
The four remaining members of the team were harshly interrogated by the Romanian police and counterintelligence officials and confessed quickly that they were working for the CIA. Remarkably enough, the Dutch role was not mentioned at all. Only the military training in the Netherlands was mentioned. The four Romanian agents soon appeared in court. The sentences were, as could be expected under the harsh Romanian communist regime, not mild. All four received the death penalty and the judges saw no reason for clemency despite the fact that all four men made full confessions and had cooperated in the investigation by revealing where they had hidden their weapons, parachutes and radio transmitters. Immediately after the verdict, against which no appeal could be lodged, the four were transferred to the Jivala prison south of Bucharest. During the last days of their lives Saplacan and the other three team members were housed in separate cells and were not allowed to speak to each other. Saplacan shared his cell his last nights with an inmate who was actually working for the Romanian Security Service. From there the four Romanian agents eventually were brought to a place in the Valea Piersicilor ('Valley of the Peach Trees'), where the Romanian regime executed almost all its opponents. The executions took place on December 27, 1951. Every agent was asked if he wanted to say something. None of the four men wanted to. Each of them was accompanied by four guards when they were brought to the execution site. Once there, the military prosecutor ordered the commander of the firing squad to inspect the weapons, set up the platoon, and call "fire!" when they were ready. The four men were killed instantly. Their bodies were buried in anonymous graves. That same day The Hague and Washington were aware of the sad fate of the agents. The communist daily De Waarheid ("The Truth") even devoted a few lines to it but of course the Dutch connection was not mentioned.

Executed? 'Too bad'!

It is striking that at the beginning of 1951 the CIA focused on the Netherlands Foreign Intelligence Service (BID) as a junior partner in its secret operations behind the Iron Curtain. Apparently the Americans wanted to form a very broad front against the Soviet Union and its allies. Was Director of Central Intelligence Smith even quietly hoping that the BID and other smaller European intelligence services would perform better than his own organization? And why did the BID participate? Perhaps the head of the BID wanted to demonstrate his daring mentality vis-à-vis the other Dutch services. It should also not be excluded that the BID wanted to gain experience with this type of operations. The service also did not run any major risks of losing its own Dutch agents like it did during World War II.
It was "only" Romanians with a completely "dark" war history who were used. If they ended up in front of the firing squad, it was "unfortunate," and nothing more. The only two things that the BID had to take good care of were finances and avoiding political risks. The first was no problem, because for 1952 the service had more than half a million guilders in its possession. Apart from that, the CIA funded a lot of the operational costs. More problematic was the second one: the involvement of the BID should absolutely not leak. It must be said that that worked out very well.

Did the Dutch government know? Whether Prime Minister Willem Drees knew about the operation is an intriguing question. The Cabinet Office was responsible for the BID. Who was kept up to date within this ministry? Documents that can shed light on this aspect have unfortunately not been found. Furthermore, it remains unclear why the BID continued with these clandestine operations so far away from the Netherlands; they were both very risky or even doomed to fail. Because in addition to Romania, the BID also planned and executed similar covert operations in Bulgaria, Albania and Czechoslovakia. Did De Muralt as head of the BID want to prove that his service was able to carry out successful operations behind the Iron Curtain? Or did he want to contribute to an U.S. national security policy, which was supported by the Dutch cabinet? Around 1950 the Cold War raged and the doctrine of "Containment" reigned, a doctrine which applied to the spheres of influence of the Soviet Union and its allies. When Dwight D. Eisenhower became U.S. president in 1952, apart from containment also the "Roll Back" doctrine was added. The Iron Curtain had to be rolled back by all means, including by using clandestine operations. The exact motives of the BID to join the CIA remain a mystery. It is clear, however, that those responsible must have known about the many failed missions behind the Iron Curtain, because if one takes a look at the Dutch newspapers from that period one can read articles about trials against and executions of dropped agents in Romania, Bulgaria and Albania. Did the BID, just like the CIA, realize at a very late stage that they were dealing with a formidable opponent, who had intelligence services that were much more professional and had much more resources and manpower? A direct consequence of the failures in Eastern Europe was that the BID shifted its attention to the allies in Western Europe, Indonesia and the Third World. In this domain they proved to be much more successful with all kinds of covert operations.

Cees Wiebes is a historian and intelligence expert. His book Samen met de CIA ("Together with the CIA") was published in late 2016.
The Tet offensive in Vietnam, which began at the beginning of the Vietnamese Lunar New Year at the end of January 1968, fifty years ago, saw almost one hundred thousand North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces attack almost all provincial capitals, major cities and military bases in South Vietnam. The battles resulted in a major military victory for US and South Vietnamese forces when they pushed the attackers out of all of the cities and inflicted between 30,000-50,000 casualties on the enemy. However, Tet was a strategic political defeat for the United States when the American public realized that the enemy was capable of mounting such an offensive and that the U.S. was far from winning the war. Tet was an earthquake that led President Lyndon Johnson to decline to run for a second term.

Tet has been considered a US intelligence failure, but that characterization should be viewed cautiously. Many declassified primary source documents and declassified or unclassified histories making use of primary sources are available and they do not depict US intelligence ahead of Tet as a bald failure.

These sources, most of them not available until this century, decades after Tet, make clear that US military intelligence units in Vietnam, the Central Intelligence Agency station in Saigon and the National Security Agency acquired and disseminated significant information indicating attacks were planned. The intelligence reached military commanders on the ground in Vietnam, but was less clear to Washington-based intelligence analysts, military and political decision makers. The intelligence warning provided was both "strategic" (large and multiple enemy attacks were planned) and "tactical" (the attacks would commence around the beginning of the Tet holiday), but was incomplete; it did not indicate that all of the attacks were coordinated and it missed many of the attacks planned by Viet Cong forces in southern South Vietnam.

Nevertheless, the commander of US forces in Vietnam, the often-maligned General William Westmoreland, heeded the intelligence he received and redeployed US forces to meet the attacks. These moves, in addition...
to US firepower superiority, may account for the decisiveness of the American military victory. More detailed intelligence might have resulted in a greater victory on the ground, but probably would not have prevented Tet from being the strategic political defeat that it was.

CIA analysts and political leaders in Washington were less persuaded by the intelligence and less prepared for the attacks than were US military and intelligence units in Vietnam. The White House and Pentagon were surprised by the country-wide nature of the attacks and by the reaction of the American public, and scrambled, ineffectively, to explain how attacks on the order of magnitude of the Tet offensive could have occurred given their past message that the war was being won.

Tet, like almost all events in US Foreign affairs history had a complex intelligence angle. To properly and fully understand intelligence supplied to political leaders and military commanders, including how, when and why leaders made decisions, students, authors of popular history and professors alike must turn to declassified primary source intelligence records. The history of political and military decisions in 20th and 21st century events is incomplete without examining intelligence input to the policy-making process. In the case of American intelligence ahead of Tet, the sources below - and their more detailed sub-sources - supply a deep understanding of what transpired. Little of this was available in the thirty years after Tet because these sources and their sub-sources remained classified. In addition to these sources, their end notes and bibliographies, researchers may find more documents about intelligence before Tet in the declassified records of the various US intelligence agencies.

In particular, the US Intelligence Community has launched an initiative to declassify many more documents pertaining to Tet. These can be found at www.intelligence.gov/tet-declassified.
In addition, many serious books and articles have been written about Tet by popular authors and scholars, many of which are sound. Highlighted here, however, are a few books about Tet by current and former members of the US Intelligence Community who are particularly adept at locating and employing declassified primary source records.


Michael Warner. “`US Intelligence and Vietnam': The Official Version(s).” *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol 25, No 5, October 2010. This is an excellent survey of the intelligence sources available to researchers of Vietnam war topics.
I had been working on a project with a colleague of mine to do research into how the US Intelligence Community has dealt with LGBT Americans both internally and externally to each agency in USIC when I decided to do a search against CIA’s CREST database of declassified agency documentation. CREST being a great equalizer in terms of what topics it hosts in its vast database (with maybe only a slight preference toward some topics over others, [see: OXCART]). It started with a single word; "transsexual." A single word, that was the whole problem. What I got back from my search through CREST was a few documents that included this archaic term for transgender people (a group I’ve taken particular interest in with my searches since I myself am transgender) appeared one time in a document that had been archived by the Agency’s incredible history staff. The only problem was that this particular file was a dozen pages long. In fact, it was a news story that was relevant for reasons that weren’t exactly clear to me, but if I intended to find the context behind the use of this one word, I would go to the first tool I had available to me; ‘control+f’.

Control+f, otherwise known as the “find in page” key combination is the greatest thing to happen to researchers since the magnifying glass. The
only problem is when you don’t have it, you notice when it’s gone. In this case, the trusty key combination did nothing. Was I really expected to read the whole 12-page document just to discover a potential lead to something? Of course, this problem has been dramatized for the reader. What I opted to do instead to enable my eminent laziness was use another technology that I have at my disposal to pry out the answer and save me some time.

The ORIS Foundation

Optical Character Recognition (OCR) is a tried and true solution to reading flattened documents of the kind you see come out of monolithic agencies (like our friendly, neighborhood intelligence agencies). It’s a technology that has far reaching applications and has in general been underappreciated. Have you ever wondered how mail gets sorted these days? I’ll tell you, mail hasn’t been sorted by hand for years, instead we use technology that relies on the United States Postal Service’s top of the line OCR technology to read my crappy handwriting to make sure that the letters I send to my pen pal get to where they’re going properly.

I took my document downloaded from CREST and put it through a program on my computer called Tesseract. Tesseract runs an algorithm against my documents, straightening them up, clearing away as much visual debris it can from the documents it views, and then reads each character visually before dropping in a searchable layer into the PDF. Finally, I had my ever important find tool back! But it didn’t stop there. If I could do this with one document, why couldn’t I do it to a dozen? Or for that matter, why not a hundred? Why not 10,000? I know that I’m not the only one who has this very same problem, so why can’t I solve it for everyone? I continued talking to my colleague Emma Best about this issue, and we settled on a way forward. Maybe we should work on starting up a foundation of some sort to support not only the collection of declassified documents, but also the OCR capability as well as a highly searchable method of going through the documents that will allow you to select for a single word from many hundreds of thousands, possibly even millions of documents. This was how the ORIS Foundation was born.
After more technical work, I found another way to make the entire project much more interesting. In addition to adding an OCR layer to each document, I took about a third of the CREST database and stripped the raw text of the document straight out, putting it into a .txt file. The process is surprisingly fast against over a hundred thousand documents with today’s computers, and what I now have is a substantial amount of raw text files that I can use as input into another tech-based product called Natural Language Processing (NLP).

The interesting thing about NLP is that it lets us do with computers what we could never do as humans. More than just searching documents, we can indeed parse the context of a document in incredible ways. By using one library, I can parse individual words out of the document. With another, I can parse out individual sentences. I can parse out names with proper titles if I want to, and with a different library, I can parse out how each individual word relates to the document overall.

Coverterm Detection
It was then that I had an idea for where to go with this. If I could determine the context of each word in each document, what do cover terms generally get labeled as? And if I could do that, could I create a sort of cover term detection system to automatically find all of the cover terms in a given document? By searching through documents that held processed text that included the context for each word for a few cover terms I knew of that would certainly appear in the document, I discovered that terms like OXCART and TAGBOARD were automatically labeled with the identifier ‘NNP’ marking them as proper nouns. Then, by searching for every proper noun in all of my documents, could I find only the proper nouns that were capitalized? Now I was onto something.
The in the afternoon of 13 September 1974, three armed men stormed the French embassy in The Hague. In an emergency call to the police, a woman with a heavy French accent said that “crazy Japanese men” were “running around with guns.” Ten minutes later, the perpetrators identified themselves in a confusing mix of English, French, and Japanese to the Dutch police, who barely spoke English. The hostage takers were members of the Japanese Red Army, an international terrorist organization with a violent track record: in addition to multiple hijackings, the group attacked an Israeli airport in 1972, wounding 75 and killing 25 people. In return for the release of 11 hostages, who included the French ambassador to the Netherlands Jacques Senard, the Japanese Red Army demanded the release of their comrade Yutaka Furuya from a French prison, one million US dollars, and a safe passage to an airport of their choice. The incident took place directly opposite the office of the Chief of Station of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and became a test case for the, traditionally, very close ties between the Dutch and American intelligence communities. Howard T. Bane, CIA chief of station in The Hague, volunteered the use of his office at the American embassy to the Dutch authorities. This way, the liaison that until then had focused on counterintelligence mostly, shifted to the counterterrorism domain. In this article, it will be explored how this shift came about, why it changed, and how exactly – thus providing a more detailed account of the dynamics of intelligence liaison. Also a lengthy sketch based on declassified official documents will be given of the beginnings and developments of the close intelligence liaison between de CIA and the Dutch intelligence community.
Sources and Methods

The UK National Archives has released another tranche of MI5 files, many of which are available for free download. “The records cover a range of subjects and span the First and Second World Wars and post-war era up to the late-1960s. Personal files include individuals classed as Second World War German intelligence agents and officers, Cold War-era Soviet intelligence officers, British Communists, and extreme right wing activists who came to the attention of MI5. Many of the files related to the Portland Spy Ring case and the arrests and interviews of Gordon Lonsdale (KV 2/4429-4466), Ethel Gee (KV 2/4472-4474), Harry Houghton (KV 2/4476-4483), and Peter and Helen Kroger (KV 2/4484-4490).” In addition, “Professor Christopher Andrew, author of The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5, has recorded a podcast giving a fascinating overview of the files in this release.”

Conference Announcements

Legally Immoral Activity: Testing the Limits of Intelligence Collection, February 11-12, 2020, The Citadel, Charleston, South Carolina. The two day interdisciplinary conference will examine the legal, ethical, social, historical and political aspect of the US Governments ability to protect its citizens in an era that warfare has no societal or personal boundaries. Call for paper presentations, workshops/interactive sessions and posters/exhibits are welcome. The conference will be held from February 11-12, 2020 on the Campus of the Citadel in Charleston, South Carolina. The Deadline for proposals is October 15, 2019.

Intelligence and the Second World War: A Brécourt Academic Conference held in conjunction with ICF 2020, June 16-18, 2020, Mercyhurst University, Erie, PA
Brécourt Academic and Mercyhurst University's Ridge College of Intelligence Studies and Applied Sciences, in association with Global War Studies, are pleased to announce an international conference on "Intelligence and the Second World War." Held in conjunction with the Intelligence Community Forum (ICF), the conference will bring together scholars and students and will endeavor to promote an interdisciplinary and international study of intelligence and intelligence-related issues in the 1919–1945 period (and beyond) by means of drawing upon the latest scholarship from a variety of disciplines. The conference will also serve as a forum for historians to discuss and debate the everexpanding field of intelligence and global conflict studies. Papers dealing with one or more of the following topics are welcome and while intelligence is the focus, papers and panels covering other related topics or taking thematic approaches are equally encouraged.

Counterintelligence / Espionage / Signals Intelligence / Science & Technology
Special Operations / Prisoners of War / Cryptology / Resistance Movements
Alliance Politics / Intelligence and Air Power / Industry / Naval Intelligence
Human Intelligence / Asymmetric Warfare / Deception Operations

Paper proposals must be submitted by 15 March 2020 and must include a brief (200 words or less) one-paragraph abstract and a one-page curriculum vitae. Panel proposals are welcome and should include a brief description of the panel's theme.

Additional conference details and registration information are available at: https://www.mercyhurst.edu/icf-wwii
Submissions and inquiries should be addressed to:
Sharon von Maier
e: brecourtacademicadm@gmail.com
t: 202 875 1436 (US number)
The conference proceedings will be published by Brécourt Academic
Conference Announcements

CALL FOR PAPERS11. Intelligence Panel at 2020 APSA meeting American Political Science Association (APSA) 10-13 September 2020 San Francisco, California, USA

Intelligence organizations occupy a multi-layered position in democracies. They are vital to their stability and promoting good governance through their ability to identify foreign threats and challenges. Doing so requires that intelligence organizations and professionals be accorded a degree of autonomy. At the same time, consistent with principles of democratic oversight and governance, intelligence agencies and professionals must be held accountable. No single method exists for doing so. Investigations, whistle blowers, free press watchdogs, leaks, the appointment of political overseers, and promoting professionalism are all used. This panel invites paper proposals and round table proposals that deal with the past, present and future challenges that intelligence faces in operating in a democracy. Possible topics include but are not limited to 1) case studies or comparative case studies over time of intelligence organizations operating in democratic systems, or comparing intelligence in democracies and authoritarian systems, 2) studies of the effectiveness of various methods of democratic control, 3) responses by intelligence organizations to challenges, 4) theoretical inquiries into the nature of politicization, populism or professionalism, 5) interaction of intelligence organizations and the media 6) overcoming intelligence failures and 7) dealing with technological change.Paper proposals must be made through the APSA proposal system. Inquiries and proposal can also be sent to Glenn Hastedt, James Madison University (hastedgp@jmu.edu)More details here.

The 2020 Annual Conference of the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE) will be held in London from June 25 to 27. The conference is being held jointly by IAFIE and the IAFIE Europe Chapter (IAFIE EC). This will be the 5th Annual Conference of IAFIE EC. The submission date for abstract proposals is January 27, 2020. Proposals for papers, panels, posters and interactive workshops are being accepted. The topics/themes for the conference are Intelligence Analysis, Intelligence Domains, Management of Intelligence Community, and Intelligence Education and Research. Notification of acceptance will be in mid-February, and papers, posters, presentations and workshop materials will be due on April 20, 2020. Authors of recent books, monographs and reports in line with these topics/themes are also invited to submit proposals to participate in Author Roundtables. The complete call can be found here: https://www.linkedin.com/posts/iafie-ec_iafie-iafie-ec-joint-conference-call-for-activity.
NASIH would like to thank the staff of the International Spy Museum for hosting our first conference. We would especially like to single out Amanda Abrell, Alexis Albion, Chris Costa, Vincent Houghton, Amanda Ohkle, Anna Slafer and Lucy Stirn for helping us make the conference so successful.

NASIH would also like to thank Dr. Michael Goodman the Director of the King's College London Intelligence & Security Group for hosting an incredible reception for Chairs, Commentators and Panelists.

We would also like to thank our student volunteers from the University of New Brunswick: Emma Allen, Patrick Donovan Henry Campbell Snyder and Mark Symons. We could not have done it without you.
Finally we would like to thank all of you who took part in the 2019 Conference.

Director of the International Spy Museum Chris Costa opens the conference.

President Mark Stout gives his closing address.

Michael Warner, John Ferris, David Sherman and David Schaefer.

Jonna Mendez offers her thoughts on the intelligence and popular culture panel.

Amanda Ohlke, John Lisle, Steve Usdin, John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr on Spies and Counter-Intelligence.
BACKGROUND
The International Spy Museum, the only public museum in the US solely dedicated to the tradecraft, history, contemporary role, and impact of intelligence, seeks a dynamic and creative individual to serve as member of the Exhibitions and Programs team. The Museum, recently reopened in a new building in downtown DC, contains the largest collection of international espionage artifacts ever placed on public display, along with wide-ranging interactive experiences, films, and audio. This nonprofit museum has competitive salaries and excellent benefits.

SUMMARY
The Historian/Curator, along with the Curator, Special Exhibits, provides the main content expertise for all museum exhibitions, programs, public inquiries, publications and media inquiries. The Historian/Curator develops, organizes, and conducts special programs such as podcasts, book talks, and VIP tours, and represents the Museum to the media through interviews. Requires flexible schedule with occasional morning/evening/weekend hours.

RESPONSIBILITIES INCLUDE:

- Teaching, public speaking, and writing for diverse ages (e.g. educator resources, tours and talks, exhibit labels, blogs, and professional articles).
- Working with the Curator, Special Exhibits, to conceptualize and develop permanent and temporary exhibitions.
- Representing the Museum to all types of media.
- Researching and interpreting the collection and assisting with the identification and acquisition of new artifacts.
- Building and expanding the Museum’s local, national, and international reputation.
- Supporting education program staff by providing content information and research on topics and speakers for programs and artifacts.
- Identifying experts in the intelligence community to present programs for the general public addressing current issues/scholarship. Conducting training for staff, responding to public content inquiries, and providing VIP tours.
- Building and expanding the Museum’s local, national and international presence, profile, and reputation with scholars and professionals in the intelligence community.

MINIMUM EDUCATION REQUIREMENTS
Advanced degree in History, Political Science, or International Relations or related field with a specialty in intelligence studies. Familiarity with history of science and technology a plus. Global perspective and understanding of diplomatic history especially encouraged.
MINIMUM EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENTS
Teaching experience required; museum, and/or intelligence community experience highly desirable.

SKILLS AND ATTRIBUTES
Mandatory:
- Excellent public speaking ability and verbal and written communication skills: understands how to tell a compelling story.
- Teaching experience and ability to work with diverse age ranges and audiences.
  * Good social skills for dealing with the public, donors, volunteers, docents, and professional colleagues.
  * Ability to work in a team setting.
  * Demonstrated ability to plan and bring to fruition and manage creative, innovative, and thought-provoking programs.
  * Demonstrated research abilities; attention to detail and accuracy.
  * Professional demeanor.
  * Computer literate.
  * Strong customer-service orientation.

Desirable:
Background in science and technology.
Background in material culture studies.
Knowledge of and ability to apply museum education concepts and strategies.

SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS
Flexible schedule with occasional morning/evening/weekend hours is also required.

To Apply
Send email with cover letter, resume, writing sample, and salary requirements.
List Historian/Curator in the subject line and send to humanresources@spymuseum.org.
NASIH 2020 Conference

The North American Society for Intelligence History and The Canadian Foreign Intelligence Project proudly announce our call for papers for the 2020 NASIH Conference

The conference will take place at Trinity College at the University Toronto
November 12 - 14, 2020

Abstracts are due on March 1, 2020
Both panel and paper proposals are Wellcome. Topics may include, but are not limited to: election meddling, SIGINT and Cyber Intelligence, Soviet and Russian intelligence, economic intelligence, intelligence analysis, counter-intelligence, the history of spies and espionage, covert operations, popular culture, whistleblowers, publishing intelligence history, the media and intelligence history and lessons learned from reading and writing intelligence history. Each abstract should contain the panel/and or paper title, a 250 word abstract and a brief cv. All proposals should be sent to s-j.corke@unb.ca
Panels and papers accepted will be notified by March 1, 2020.

NASIH GRADUATE STUDENT ESSAY PRIZE

NASIH is also proud to announce three prizes for the best graduate student essay in intelligence history. The top three papers will be presented at the 2020 NASIH Conference. The Prize includes up to $1000 (CND) each to be used for airfare and accommodation and an additional $250 (CND) cash prize for the best essay written by a man and the best essay written by a woman. All three papers will be published in the Journal of Military and Strategic Studies. Each paper must be between 20 and 25 pages. Papers over 25 pages will not be reviewed. The Deadline for submission is June 1, 2020. All papers are to be submitted to ferris@ucalgary.ca


Aimean Dean, Nine Lives: My Time as the West’s Top Spy Inside Al Qaeda. Oneworld, 2018.


2018


President Sarah-Jane Corke  Ph.D. Associate professor, University of New Brunswick. She is the author of US Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy: Truman Secret Warfare and the CIA, Routledge, 2008. She has published articles in Intelligence and National Security, The Journal of Strategic Studies and the Journal of Conflict Studies. She is now working on a biography of John Paton and Patricia Grady Davies.

Vice President Calder Walton is Assistant Director of Harvard Kennedy School's Applied History Project, where he is currently undertaking two major research projects on the history of intelligence, statecraft, and international relations. First, he is completing a book about British, US, and Soviet intelligence in the Cold War. Second, he is general editor of the multi-volume Cambridge History of Espionage and Intelligence to be published by Cambridge University Press. Over three volumes, with 90 chapters by leading scholars, this project will be a landmark study of intelligence, exploring its use and abuse in statecraft and warfare from the ancient world to the present day. Both of these projects build on Calder's previous research at Cambridge University (UK), where he wrote his first book, Empire of Secrets. British intelligence, the Cold War and the Twilight of Empire (2013) and where he was a principal researcher on Christopher Andrew's authorized centenary history of the British Security Service (MIS) Defend the Realm (2009). Calder's research has appeared in leading print and broadcast media on both sides of the Atlantic.

BOARD

John R. Ferris  Ph.D. John is a professor of History at the University of Calgary. He is the author of Intelligence and Strategy, Routledge, 2007 and a number of other books on British strategic history. At the present time he is writing the authorized history of GCHQ.


Scholar/Practitioner David Sherman (B.A. Duke; Ph.D Cornell) retired from the Federal Government’s Senior Executive Service in 2017. He served for 32 years at the National Security Agency, where he held a variety of managerial, analytic, and staff positions. Dr. Sherman also was assigned to the staffs of the National Security Council and National Economic Council, represented NSA to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and – from 2007 to 2010 – was Dean of Academic Programs and Visiting Professor at the National War College. Prior joining government, he was Adjunct Faculty at Cornell University, where he taught for four years. Dr. Sherman is the author of several studies on the history of American signals intelligence, including The First Americans: The 1941 U.S. Codebreaking Mission to Bletchley Park (2016) and, Ann’s War: One Woman’s Journey to the Codebreaking Victory over Japan (2019).

Ex-Officio Mark Stout Ph.D. Mark is a Senior Lecturer and Director of the MA in Global Security Studies at Johns Hopkins University’s Krieger Schol of Arts & Sciences Advanced Academic Programs in Washington, DC. He is a former U.S. intelligence officer and former Historian of the International Spy Museum. Mark was President of NASIHE from 2016-2019.
NASIH EXECUTIVE TEAM

**NASIH Administrator Mary Barton** is a wargaming analyst at a Washington DC based consulting firm. She works on issues connected to cyber security. Previously, she worked as a historian for the Historical Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), US Department of Defense. Her book manuscript, *Counterterrorism Between the Wars: An International History of the Great Powers, 1919 -1937*, is forthcoming with Oxford University Press. Her previous publications include articles in Diplomatic History, the Journal of British Studies, and Studies in Intelligence. Dr. Barton received her PhD in history from the University of Virginia in December 2016.

**NASIH Treasurer Sara Bush Castro Ph.D** is an Assistant Professor at the Department of History, United States Air Force Academy. She received her Ph.D in 2017 from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Prior to that she worked as an intelligence analyst between 2003 - 2009.

**Graduate Student Representative Mallory Needleman** is a first year History PhD student at American University. Mallory earned her MA in Holocaust Studies at Haifa University in Israel. Her broad interests include mid-century Lithuania and its relationship to the United States. She recently presented her research on Stasys Žakevičius at the inaugural NASIH conference this past October.

This newsletter was edited by Dr. Sarah-Jane Corke. Each article is reviewed by two members of our board. If you are interested in submitting an article to the newsletter or have any other information you would like included in the next newsletter please contact us at nasintelhist@gmail.com.

All of our newsletters can be found on our website at https://www.intelligencehistory.org/newsletters

Please also feel free to follow us on Twitter @SocIntelHist

NASIH is looking for a webmaster. If you are would like to join a community of scholars interested in intelligence history and have experience in this area please E-mail s-j.corke@unb.ca.