A WORD FROM OUR PRESIDENT

By: Calder Walton

Dear Members,

I am humbled to take over as President of the North American Society for Intelligence History (NASIH) from Sarah-Jane Corke. Under Sarah-Jane’s leadership, the Society has grown from strength to strength. We owe her, as well as Mark Stout a debt of gratitude; their work together made NASIH into the organization it is today.

Our membership and activities have expanded despite the dislocation and stress we have all experienced from the COVID-19 pandemic. One silver lining of the recent “plague year”—or rather years—has been the Society’s pivot to events
online, bringing scholars with likeminded interests together even when physically apart. During the pandemic, NASIH had become a leading forum for historians, scholars from other fields, and practitioners interested in studying the history of intelligence and national security.

My aim, and strategy, for the Society is to continue to give NASIH Sarah-Jane's momentum. Our virtual brown bag events have grown into successful bi-monthly virtual events. Additionally, our other initiatives like the Silent Game Book Club, the Soviet Intelligence History Research Group, and the Women's Intelligence Network have expanded as well.

Although the pandemic continues to present challenges to our daily lives, we here at NASIH have some exciting events to look forward to: this coming summer, in July 2022, we will be holding our virtual conference, and then we hope to see you all at our in-person conference in the summer of 2023.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank members of the Society’s Board who are retiring this year: John Ferris and Kathryn Olmstead. We have been very lucky to have them. We are also lucky to have new members joining the Board: Timothy Sayle, Kathryn Barbier, and Michael Miner. I would like to extend my warm welcome to them all. NASIH (and I) are also lucky to have an outstanding Vice President, Sara Bush Castro. Mallory Needleman continues to be an exemplary graduate student representative, and Sabrina Volpe our superb Administrator. Brendan MaGee has done wonders with NASIH’s website as well.

If any of our members have suggestions for how we can improve the Society, we are always eager to hear.

In the meantime, I would like to extend my warm wishes to you and your families for a happy, and healthy, Holidays and New Year!

All good wishes,

Calder Walton
President, NASIH
The North American Society for Intelligence History (NASIH) was formed in the summer of 2016 by Sarah-Jane Corke and Mark Stout. Our goal was to encourage and support the study of intelligence history in Canada and the United States and to highlight the accomplishments of those in our field.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

NASIH Conference 2022

Due to a dramatic rise of COVID cases in Calgary and the high potential for continued difficulties with travel to the region for an indefinite period, we have decided to shift our July 2022 conference online. While we all prefer meeting in person, pivoting to a virtual conference ensures safety and may ease the burden of participating for those facing travel and funding restrictions in the wake of the pandemic. We look forward to scheduling our next in-person conference in Calgary, ideally in 2023.

Women's Intelligence Network (WIN)

As WIN approaches their one year anniversary, they would like to highlight their flagship program: the WIN mentoring program. It consists of online meetings for junior colleagues to ask questions or bounce off ideas to get informal and constructive feedback from mentees. Anyone interested in joining the WIN mentoring program – as mentor or mentee, please email womenintelnetwork@gmail.com! And watch out for the next events / follow us on Twitter, @womenknowintel.

WIN continues to work towards more inclusive syllabi and inclusion and diversity in intelligence research and teaching. WIN has organized a few roundtables on this topic and Claudia Hillebrand is in the process of creating a WIN Syllabus – more on this in the coming months!
The Second World War Research Group

The Second World War Research Group, North America (SWWRG, NA) is holding its third scholarly workshop, “Information at War,” on 18-19 February 2022. The workshop, which is hosted by the Department of History, Sam Houston State University, will be a virtual meeting and will connect graduate students and scholars from Canada and the United States. The event will feature a keynote address from Michael Graziano, author of *Errand into the Wilderness of Mirrors: Religion and the History of the CIA* on Friday and Saturday panels on wartime propaganda, intelligence, and espionage. Attendees will need to pre-register; registration links forthcoming.

Brown Bags

The Society runs frequent virtual brown bags on Zoom to provide intelligence historians a venue to discuss their work. Presentations can take the form of talks on upcoming projects, unpublished work, published articles or published books. All brown bags take place on Tuesdays, 12:00 – 1:00 PM Eastern. Registration for brown bags is through Eventbrite. Links to registration pages can be found on our website, on our Twitter feed, by searching Eventbrite, and in emails sent to members. To suggest a topic for a brown bag please email Mark Stout at mstout4@jhu.edu.

The last Tuesday of every month is reserved for meetings of the **Silent Game Book Club**, which is devoted to the scholarly discussion of spy fiction. For more information see the link on the website or email Filip Kovacevic at fkovacevic@usfca.edu.

Our schedule also includes brown bags offered by the Women’s Intelligence Network (WIN). To register to attend a WIN Brown Bag, email womenintelnetwork@gmail.com.

**UPCOMING BROWN BAGS**

**January 4, 2022.** Aaron Bateman, “Intelligence and Alliance Politics: America, Britain, and the Strategic Defense Initiative.” Aaron Bateman is pursuing a Ph.D. at the Johns Hopkins University.


**January 18, 2022.** Dr. Alpo Rusi, Ph.D., “The Influence of the KGB on Finnish Foreign Policy, 1982–91.” Dr. Rusi is a former diplomat who has held several Ambassadorial positions for the Government of Finland and from 1994 to 1999 was Foreign and Security Policy Adviser to the President of Finland.

**January 25, 2022.** Silent Game Book Club – Frederick Forsyth, *The Fox*. 
ANNOUNCEMENTS

Featured Previous Brown Bags


The topic: Drawn from Elias's new book Gossip Men: J. Edgar Hoover, Joe McCarthy, Roy Cohn, and the Politics of Insinuation, this talk explored how concerns surrounding early Cold War national security combined with a growing industry in celebrity and political gossip to ultimately promote McCarthyism and help change the way Americans interact with matters of "national intelligence."

Gossip Men: J. Edgar Hoover, Joe McCarthy, Roy Cohn, and the Politics of Insinuation, is available to preorder from UCP or Bookshop.org.

The first photo is of (L to R) Roy Cohn, Joseph McCarthy, and G. David Schine during the 1954 Army-McCarthy hearings; credit: Eve Arnold, Magnum Photos.

The second photo is the August, 1953 issue of Confidential magazine, which included an article insinuating that former (and future) Democratic presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson had engaged in homosexual affairs. Credit: Private Collection.

Dr. Elias is a Visiting Professor of History at St. Olaf College.

We thank him for his photo contributions.
Call for Papers: Imagining a New U.S. National Security Act for the 21st Century

Imagine if you woke up tomorrow to news of:

- A massive cyber-attack that irreparably damaged financial markets and shut down critical infrastructure, or
- A significant conventional defeat due to strategic surprise like happened at Pearl Harbor, or
- The release of a manufactured pathogen that marked the beginning of a new global pandemic.

Each of the scenarios above, and others, could be caused in part by a catastrophic intelligence failure. Drawing on the lessons of World War II and in the context of the impending Cold War, the United States Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947 to address institutional challenges and to set favorable conditions for U.S. intelligence and national security. Now, nearly a quarter of the way through the 21st century, the National Security Act of 1947 remains the bedrock of the U.S. national security enterprise, but in a world in which the threats and challenges have dramatically changed. We pose an overarching question: If you were starting from scratch, what might a National Security Act for the next 75 years contain to address current shortcomings and to improve intelligence capabilities, structures, and organizations to meet requirements in the years ahead?

The Intelligence and Applied History Projects at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center invite submissions for an essay contest on imagining a new U.S. National Security Act for the 21st century. Essays should consider the rise of China, technological advances, globalization, changes in U.S. relative power, redefinition of national security to include economic and cyber issues, espionage at scale, compression of decision time, and climate change—among other trends you deem important—and how these factors might drive a paradigm shift for U.S. intelligence and national security in general.

As you examine this question and possible approaches to a reformed national intelligence enterprise, we invite you to provide a framework for new legislation along with ideas for what the United States should prioritize. The best papers should address the national interests at stake and the most pressing challenges your construct is designed to address. What institutions, mechanisms, legal requirements, or other factors would you choose to create, merge, alter, or abolish and why? What efficiencies, benefits, and synergies are part of the big picture objective? Finally, what are the foreseeable impediments to your proposed changes and what is driving them?

This call for papers is open to members of the public. Papers will be evaluated by a panel of current and former U.S. intelligence practitioners and knowledgeable academics. The top three papers will receive cash prizes of $5,000, $2,500, and $1,000. The top three authors will also be invited to participate in a panel discussion convened at Harvard (virtually or in person) in the spring of 2022, in which they will brief senior U.S. intelligence officials on their papers, to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the National Security Act of 1947. With permission, the winning paper will be published in whole or in part in a Belfer Center product.

Papers should be no more than 2500 words Times New Roman 12pt font in Word or PDF format, and must be received no later than March 18. Please email papers to: pbriscoe@hks.harvard.edu and maria_robson@hks.harvard.edu and include your name, contact email, and phone number.
Are you a Ph.D. Student writing intelligence history? Have you finished your comprehensive exams? Are you looking to get your first or second article published? Do you need some structure around your writing program? Would you like to connect with other graduate students working in the same area?

Beginning in January 2022 NASIH will initiate a Graduate Student Writing Workshop. It is designed to accomplish six goals:

1. Offer a writing accountability platform.
2. Provide a small, friendly group where you can present a first draft of an article in a collegial setting.
3. This will lead to the presentation of your article at a NASIH brown bag with a leading scholar in your field chairing the session.
4. Once you have incorporated any revisions from the brown bag we will provide a review of your work by two editors from the leading journals in the field of Intelligence Studies.
5. We will then provide additional guidance on which journal you should submit your work to.
6. Finally we will walk you through the publishing and peer-review process.

Space is limited
Registration is on a first come first serve basis

INITIAL REGISTRATION ENDS JANUARY 31, 2022

Please send your CV to Dr Sarah-Jane Corke
s-j.corke@unb.ca

Open to all ABD PhD students regardless of location.
The working language of the group will be English
The Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania has digitized many volumes of top secret KGB in-house journals and published them on the Internet. The aim of the journals was to inform the KGB officers about the latest developments in several fields related to state security, and they remain classified in Putin’s Russia to this day. In one of the journals, more precisely, in the volume No. 23 of the Proceedings of the Felix Dzerzhinsky Higher School of the KGB published in 1981, I came across an article about Yugoslavia.

The article with a long and cumbersome title - “The Use of the Territory and Citizens of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [SFRY] by the Intelligence Services of the Imperialist States to Conduct Subversive Activities Against the Soviet Union” – is signed by Major V. A. Tikhonenkov.2

The title already gives a sense of the KGB’s attitude towards Yugoslavia. In other words, though political and economic relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia seemed to be on an upward trajectory at the time (in the late 1970s), the KGB approached Yugoslavia with a high degree of suspicion.

Tikhonenkov begins his article by claiming that, in comparative perspective, the U.S. intelligence service was the best positioned and most influential in Yugoslavia, though both the British and West German intelligence services were also very active. He asserts that the main priority of these services was to create roadblocks and tensions in the relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.

According to Tikhonenkov, one of the ways that the Western intelligence services attempted to do so was to spread rumors that the Soviet Union would invade and occupy Yugoslavia after Tito’s death. In contrast, Tikhonenkov alleges that the exact opposite was the case: it was the West that worked on the disintegration of Yugoslavia by prodding Yugoslav republics to pull away from federal policies and institutions. In the case of Slovenia, for instance, Tikhonenkov claims that the Western intelligence services encouraged the development of strong economic ties with Western companies and banks. On the other hand, the strategy in Serbia was to advocate the need for a “broad democracy,” implicitly hinting that the ethnic rights of the Serbs living outside Serbia needed to be enhanced.

In addition, Tikhonenkov rejects the allegations of Western media directed at Yugoslavia at that time about the Soviet covert assistance of the nationalist émigré circles, in particular, the Croat émigré organizations, in their explicit anti-Yugoslav political efforts. However, he does admit to his KGB audience that certain members of these organizations did contact Soviet embassies in Western Europe with offers of collaboration. But, according to him, all such offers were turned down.

Furthermore, Tikhonenkov claims that Western intelligence services regularly used the territory of Yugoslavia to recruit Soviet citizens who came from the Soviet Union, either on official business or as tourists.
For example, he describes how some Yugoslav hosts, in collusion with their Western intelligence “mentors,” often invited Soviet diplomatic officials and Soviet scientists to private parties where “in the company of young women” they tried to persuade them to defect to the West. According to Tikhonenkov, in addition to the big cities, the coastline of Montenegro was also used as a setting for similar recruitment attempts. For instance, he cites the case of a Soviet military ship’s visit to the Montenegrin port of Tivat in 1976 and claims that three Soviet sailors and one officer stated to the KGB counterintelligence after their visit that their Yugoslav hosts tried to convince them not to return to the ship and offered them assistance in emigrating to the West.

Tikhonenkov seems particularly vehement in his criticism of the alleged behavior of some Yugoslavs who had lived and worked in the Soviet Union and for whom, according to him, Soviet citizens had felt “sincere sympathy and friendship,” which they betrayed by secretly collecting valuable political, economic, military and other information for the Western, primarily U.S., intelligence services. In this context, he refers to the case of a former Yugoslav ambassador to Moscow, though he does not reveal his name.

At the same time, however, considering the type and nature of the information Tikhonenkov appears to have accessed for his article, one gets a clear impression that the KGB also had its own sympathizers and sources high up in the Yugoslav government circles. Tikhonenkov might have provided a subtle hint about who they were when he cited positive statements made about the Soviet Union by Tito’s national security adviser Ivan Mišković and the Yugoslav federal secretary (minister) for internal affairs Franjo Herlević.

Interestingly, at the end of the article, Tikhonenkov also warns that after the visit of the Chinese Communist leader Hu Guofeng to Yugoslavia in 1978, it was to be expected that China too would become an active intelligence player in Yugoslavia and seek political allies for its anti-Soviet foreign policy goals.

In conclusion, the key takeaway is that while the KGB counterintelligence did not discount the possibility of the Soviet Union improving political and economic relations with Yugoslavia in the future, they still considered Yugoslavia an untrustworthy, “Trojan horse” of the West.

Originally from Montenegro, Filip Kovacevic has lectured and taught at the universities across Europe, the Balkans, the former USSR, and the U.S., including two years at Smolny College in St. Petersburg, the first liberal arts college in Russia. He currently teaches at the University of San Francisco and is a researcher of Russian and East European state security and intelligence organizations. He runs "The Chekist Monitor," a blog on the operations and personalities of the Soviet and Russian state security and intelligence organizations and is a board member of the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE).


This is the English version of my article published in Monitor, an independent political weekly in Montenegro, in March 2021.
On September 16, Paul Marsden joined the Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary International History to elaborate on his timely article “Lost and Fonds: Our National Archives’ Poor Record” in the Literary Review of Canada. These reflections kicked off a virtual conversation about the vagaries of official documentary evidence, and challenges and opportunities facing scholars working on Canadian security, intelligence and diplomatic history.

Marsden’s view that Canada lags behind allies and international partners on transparency and the declassification of government documents is supported by decades of experience as a military archivist and civil servant at NATO and Library and Archives Canada. Yet “some [Canadian] institutions are behaving like it’s still the late 1940s, and they’re treating any document which mentions an ally as an existential threat to our current-day relationships.” Marsden proposes a simple thirty-year review of classified materials, which would require the security and intelligence bureaucracy to stipulate clear conditions that would allow a Government of Canada document to be released.

Tim Sayle, Director of the International Relations Program at Trinity College, chaired the first of two panels of archivists, academics and policymakers. Thomas Juneau of the University of Ottawa’s contributions were shaped by his experience as the co-chair of the National Security Transparency Advisory Group. National policies on transparency and declassification need not be static, and the group’s ongoing advisory work with Public Safety Canada is one possible avenue of change. Department of National Defence historian Isabel Campbell shared compelling anecdotes about past research into the wartime contributions of the Women’s Royal Canadian Naval Service. In addition to highlighting the value of government documents, Campbell used her example of the WRCNS to identify a need to bring in qualified and diverse people to lend meaning and substance to new policies and programs. Senator Peter Boehm, now Chair of the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, witnessed the evolution of information management practices within government over the course of a distinguished career as a foreign service officer. Senator Boehm brought a dose of humour to the discussion, quipping that perhaps Canadians are wary of declassification because they “are still recovering from the fact that our longest-serving Prime Minister had remarkable diaries.”

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The second panel was ably chaired by former National Archivist of Canada Ian Wilson. Duke historian Susan Colbourn spoke to the ways that official declassification policies are impacting the parameters of her next book, as well as the ways the government’s Access to Information process has constrained her past work. Dr. Colbourn posed thoughtful questions about the links between transparency, declassification and the value Canadians attribute to their history. Daniel German addressed the volume and potential of LAC security and intelligence holdings, and the need to revisit decades-old security classifications applied to thousands of “secret” and “top secret” files in Ottawa. Last but not least, Allison Knight of the Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada helped demystify the ATIP process and addressed institutional cultures and priorities within government departments that can obstruct the disclosure of documents.

The “Lost and Fonds” event concluded with a lively Q&A. The full event can be viewed online at: https://youtu.be/uJ3vNFrlLl0. The Graham Centre extends its sincere thanks to the chairs and panelists for their generous willingness to share their time and ideas, and for their research and advocacy.

Sam Eberlee is a PhD student at the University of Toronto. His research focuses on intelligence history and the post-1945 history of international relations.
By: Meghan Smith

The relationship between the President of the United States and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is symbiotic but, according to Melissa Graves, an Assistant professor at The Citadel, it is also defined, “by a structural and constitutional conflict of interest.” Unlike other American intelligence organizations the FBI does not have a governing charter and is therefore subject to the desires of the sitting president. Graves argues this to be a conflict of interest as any investigations of the president fall under FBI jurisdiction. This fundamental flaw, that Presidents oversee investigations into their own actions was, according to Graves, “especially pronounced during Watergate.”

In her insightful new book, Graves traces the relationship between Nixon’s White House and the FBI beginning with Nixon’s first inauguration in 1969, through to the Watergate investigation, which culminated in Nixon’s resignation in disgrace. Graves structures her book around the relationship between both of Nixon’s FBI Directors, J. Edgar Hoover, and L. Patrick Gray, while using Watergate as the central event or “pivotal moment” that exposed the FBI to the manipulations of the President.

Graves builds on earlier works, such as that of scholar Max Holland. He, too, emphasized the role the FBI played in bringing down Nixon’s presidency. Graves, however, pushes his argument further by examining the FBI, not as a monolith, but rather as a group of individuals. Graves thus places the credit for taking down Nixon not so much on the FBI as an organization, in fact she has few positive words to say about its leader during the Watergate crisis, but rather on the individual agents investigating the case. By returning agency to the individual agents Graves is able to navigate the complex relationship between the FBI and the White House. Additionally, she is able to provide understanding as to how an otherwise handicapped agency was able to bring down the President.

Though her main focus is the relationship between Nixon and the FBI, Graves also helps to shed light on other elements of policing during the Nixon administration which have long been debated. These include the Huston Plan, which was targeted against a number of resistance organizations, including the Black Panther Party. The plan included a number of illegal activities such as wiretapping, and invasive searches. Graves suggests that Hoover sought to limit these actions, in response to growing public animosity towards the FBI. Hoover’s decision to reject Nixon’s demands to target the “Radical New Left” enraged the president. In angry response, Nixon created the “Plumbers” to undertake operations that the Bureau would not. He also launched a campaign to undermine the credibility and power of the FBI and its director with “too much power.”

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The use of oral history in this book is what truly sets it apart from previous works. Graves interviews with the FBI agents brings a level of humanity to a difficult period in American history. Her account creates an image of these men as heroes, who were resistant to Nixon’s tyrannical nature. In doing so, she challenges the traditional argument that it was reporters, in particular, Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein of the Washington Post, that brought down the president. The concentration on individuals makes what is a dense topic, infinity readable, and exciting. While Graves story has many elements of the David and Goliath fable, FBI agents versus a mad President, good over evil there is also a melancholy note that runs throughout her account. She is painfully aware of the time in which she was writing this book, and it echoes through to the very last page, as she concludes, “[y]ou take the outcome of Watergate, and you look at our society today. Has anything changed?”

Megan Smith is a graduate student at Queens University in Canada. She plans to begin her Ph.D. in the fall of 2022.

Nixon’s FBI: Hoover, Watergate, and a Bureau in Crisis is by Melissa Graves (2020)

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 15-16.
4. Ibid., 6.
5. Ibid., 202.
Conspiracy theories are some of the most dangerous weapons in the arsenal of intelligence agents around the world. During the Cold War, the KGB tried to discredit the U.S. government by spreading conspiracy theories that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had killed President John F. Kennedy, tried to assassinate Pope John Paul II, and covered up a US bioweapons lab leak of the virus that causes Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome or AIDS (1). To understand these and other destabilizing “fake news” efforts, scholars of intelligence need to explore the psychology and history of conspiracy theories. In particular, we need to study how these messengers of fear came up with their theories, why they resonated with so many people around the world, and whether these narratives served psychological functions for their originators as well as their intended audiences.

Conspiracy Theories in Eastern Europe, which includes essays by historians, literature professors, cultural theorists, political scientists, and other scholars, represents the first comprehensive attempt to collect the work of scholars who study conspiracy theories in Eastern Europe from World War I up to the current moment. By focusing on the eastern half of the European continent, the authors challenge the notion that conspiracy theories are primarily a product of western political culture. “Some of the best-known international conspiracy theories,” the editors say in the introduction, “are co-created by American, Western, and Eastern European actors” (ebook loc. 2).

The authors demonstrate that these Eastern European conspiracist narratives have never been fringe phenomena, as they have sometimes been in Western Europe and the United States, but instead are central to Eastern Europeans’ views of the world. In fact, the editors argue, the prevalence of real government conspiracies in this region has established conspiracy theories as “a perfectly legitimate way to make sense of the world” (ebook loc. 21).

The volume focuses on four thematic areas: the use of conspiracy theories by authoritarian regimes; anti-Semitic theories; narratives of national victimhood; and new trends and tropes in Eastern European conspiracy theories. The thirteen essays cover a wide array of pre-World War II, Cold War-era, and post-Socialist nations in the region, including Russia, the USSR, Hungary, Romania, Belarus, Yugoslavia, Poland, Moldova, Ukraine, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and North Macedonia. The theories that originated in these countries often traversed national boundaries and helped knit together transnational, populist groups on the left and the right. These intercultural exchanges continued throughout the Cold War, and seldom stayed confined to the Warsaw Pact nations. The iron curtain, in other words, proved to be a very porous boundary.

The alleged villains of these conspiracy narratives range from the usual suspects—Jews, Bolsheviks, Freemasons, the European Union, and George Soros—to more surprising bad actors (such as gender studies professors). The authors work to explain the psychological, as well as the political, utility of these theories. The conspiracists find immense satisfaction in charging that some sort of internal or external “other” is responsible for their suffering. Narratives of victimhood restore their sense of control.
Of particular interest to scholars of intelligence are the chapters that focus on Cold War disinformation campaigns and Stalinist conspiracy theories. The editors assert in the introduction that the early Cold War was a “golden age” of conspiracy theorizing, with McCarthyist and Stalinist narratives dominating political life on both sides of the iron curtain. The shelves of my home library groan under the weight of the books by U.S. historians about McCarthyism, but most Americanists are not aware of the parallel narratives within the Soviet bloc. The historian Pascal Girard, for example, examines Stalinist conspiracy theories spread by French and Italian Communists, and concludes that these theories actually destabilized and weakened the French and Italian Communist parties. Anna Kirziuk, in one of the most fascinating chapters, argues that internal KGB documents show that Soviet agents did not merely weaponize conspiracy theories for political purposes: they sometimes internalized them. KGB and CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) leaders, for example, genuinely believed that Soviet dissidents like Andrei Sakharov were not independent actors but instead puppets controlled by “external evil influence and other people’s will” (ebook loc. 69).

Kirziuk analyzes the psychological—as well as the tactical—value of conspiracy theories for Soviet intelligence operatives and political leaders. KGB officers used conspiracy theories “to justify themselves to the party’s leaders,” she writes (ebook loc. 72). Theories about Western conspiracies made the Soviet leaders and secret warriors feel more important: if the imperialists were plotting against them, they must be doing something right. In the 1980s, as the Soviet regime faced many internal challenges, these conspiracy theories helped KGB and CPSU leaders to maintain a sense of righteousness and purpose. “The psychological benefits of conspiracy narratives,” she writes, “were of critical importance to both compensate for the lack of control and to protect one’s positive self-identity and political beliefs” (ebook loc. 81).

The insights of these essays could help Western scholars to reframe the study of Soviet-era disinformation campaigns. According to these authors, some Soviet disinformation specialists might have come to believe the “fake news” that they and their colleagues had crafted. These merchants of doubt were not, in other words, the master manipulators that western agents perceived, but instead prisoners of their own constructions and their shared delusions.


**Conspiracy Theories in Eastern Europe Tropes and Trends** is edited by Anastasiya Astapova, Onoriu Calăcel, Corneliu Pintilescu, Tamás Scheibner (2021)
A small office building located in the center of what is probably the best known of Washington, D.C.’s historic African-American neighborhoods once served as the training school for the National Security Agency.

1438 U Street NW was built in 1912 as the US Postal Service’s first substation in Washington, providing residents with an alternative to the main facility on Pennsylvania Avenue. Intended to be a model for other post offices throughout the city, it was next door to a business that made and marketed patent medicines that promised miracle cures but even then were dismissed as “quackery” with no basis in science.

The Post Office on U Street closed in 1940. After World War II, it became the training facility for the Army Security Agency, one of several signal intelligence agencies in the U.S. military that within a few years would be consolidated into NSA. The NSA school offered orientation courses for new employees as well as language instruction and basic training in signal intelligence tradecraft. More advanced training in specific disciplines such as cryptanalysis was handled by NSA’s operational arms elsewhere in Washington and in nearby Arlington, Virginia. The old Post Office building also housed offices that handled personnel and security matters. Unlike other NSA facilities in the area, which were protected by uniformed military personnel, U Street was guarded by NSA security officers in plain clothes. NSA’s first director, Army General Ralph Canine, stopped by regularly to check in with staff and visit with the students.

If NSA thought that a small building in a bustling downtown Washington neighborhood would offer some anonymity it may well have thought wrong. For decades, U Street was the business and cultural center of Washington’s African-American community, rivaling Harlem in New York and known for a time as Black Broadway, given the number of theaters in the area. While during World War II the Army’s predecessor of NSA had taken small steps toward integration, all of the staff in the personnel and security offices at 1438 U Street were white, as were the instructors at the school. Nearly all of the students were as well. There were some notable exceptions. Minnie McNeal, later Minnie McNeal Kenny, had worked at the Census Bureau before interviewing with NSA. She retrained as a linguist at U Street and rose through the ranks until, decades later, she became the head of what would then be a far larger NSA training facility in Maryland. She ended her career in the 1990s overseeing not just the school but the agency’s personnel and security offices as well. At least one local college graduate, Lillian Spearman, a member of Howard University’s Class of 1951 who majored in German, took courses with NSA at U Street as well.

One anecdote illustrates the stark contrast between those going in and out of the NSA building and the population of the surrounding area. Decades after the agency left the neighborhood, one of the building’s security officers recalled a time when his supervisor – a former Los Angeles policeman – decided to get a haircut and walked across U Street to a bustling barber shop. Like many similar establishments, the shop was a place where locals gathered to swap the news.
Once the NSA officer was seated, he watched as, one after another, the African-American men left the shop as soon as the barber was done cutting their hair. Soon, other than the barber himself, he was the only person in the shop. “He looked like a cop,” his fellow officer surmised, “so they made themselves scarce.” It seems unlikely that residents along U Street may have ever learned what exactly was going on inside. Some might well have thought it was an FBI facility set up to keep tabs on them. Regardless, NSA kept the U Street facility open until the late 1950s, when it moved with the rest of the agency to its newly constructed headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland. The building has had a variety of tenants since then. In the wake of the pandemic, the current owners are looking to attract new businesses to the site.

David Sherman (B.A. Duke; Ph.D Cornell) retired from the Federal Government’s Senior Executive Service in 2017. He served for 32 years at the National Security Agency, where he held a variety of managerial, analytic, and staff positions. Dr. Sherman also was assigned to the staffs of the National Security Council and National Economic Council, represented NSA to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and from 2007 to 2010 was Dean of Academic Programs and Visiting Professor at the National War College.
The Changing Faces of Intelligence History

Intelligence history was once considered a male dominated field. Today that is beginning to change. In order to highlight that transformation, NASIH would like to introduce you to four young female historians working in intelligence history. They are Dr. Mary Barton, Dr. Maria Robson, Dr. Alexandra Sukalo, and Mallory Needleman. We could not be prouder of the work that these woman are doing. If you are a young scholar and would like NASIH to highlight your work please contact us.

Mary Barton, Ph.D.

In January 2021, Oxford University Press published Dr. Mary Barton's book, *Counterterrorism Between the Wars: An International History, 1919-1937*. *Counterterrorism Between the Wars* is the first comprehensive study to fit together the legacy of the mass production of weapons during the Great War with the diplomacy of the interwar era and the rise of state-sponsored terrorism during the 1920s and 1930s. The book also highlights the growth of intelligence capabilities among the great powers during the interwar years. In the 1920s, the U.S. State Department began working with British intelligence to share information about the Moscow sponsored Communist International (Comintern). Reports from British intelligence agencies and American diplomatic missions in eastern Europe documented Soviet support of foreign terrorist organizations, entrenching an anti-Soviet orientation among State Department. The Soviet Union was not the only government backing terrorist groups in the 1920s and 1930s. The peace treaties and territorial settlements that followed the First World War spurred state-sponsored terrorism and proxy wars throughout Europe. Attempts by the international community to use international law to regulate government support of foreign terrorist groups failed to prevent and deter state-sponsored terrorism, foreshadowing the difficulty of ensuring international cooperation against terrorism in the post-1945 period.

Dr. Barton is currently continuing the intelligence story started in *Counterterrorism Between the Wars* by writing a history of the establishment of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance. “Five Eyes” is the more recent descriptor for the consortium of shared signals intelligence among the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. This alliance derived from agreements during the Second World War and the signing of the “British-US Communication Intelligence Agreement” (BRUSA Agreement) by representatives of the London Signals Intelligence Board and its American counterpart in March 1946. Later renamed the United Kingdom-United States of America (UKUSA) Agreement and expanded to include Canada, Australia, and New Zealand as “UKUSA collaborating Commonwealth countries,” the postwar agreement also included guidelines for sharing information with unspecified Third Party countries.

Shrouded in secrecy, the UKUSA Agreement provided the intelligence infrastructure for America’s global reach during the Cold War. However, while the Cold War ended, the Five Eyes alliance continued. And, despite a series of domestic surveillance controversies in the 1970s and 2000s in almost all the partner nations, the alliance has taken on a significant role in the crafting of foreign and military policies by partner nations since the al-Qaeda terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
More recently, Five Eyes has become a shield of the (increasingly diverse) Anglo World in defense of liberal democracies. Based on recently declassified documents in Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States, this book will tell the story of the origins of this unique and enduring partnership, focusing on the addition of Australia and New Zealand to the alliance at a time when the Korean War dramatically increased the danger of global war and the United States was replacing the United Kingdom as the global protector of democratic capitalism. With tensions rising again in the Pacific, Five Eyes stands at the forefront of the U.S. competition with the People’s Republic of China, a contest that will define geopolitics for the rest of this century.

Dr. Mary Barton works as an analyst for the U.S. federal government. Previously, she supported the U.S. Department of Defense as a historian and a wargaming analyst. Mary received a Ph.D. in history from the University of Virginia in December 2016, and completed postdoctoral fellowships at Dartmouth College and Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).

Maria A. Robson Morrow, Ph.D.

Dr. Robson’s research addresses the gap in the intelligence cooperation literature when it comes to private sector intelligence professionals. Existing research on intelligence cooperation does not adequately account for private sector partners. In a rapidly changing global threat environment where risks transcend borders, private actors have developed their own intelligence capabilities and share information to mitigate risks from threats such as terrorism or civil unrest. Private risk intelligence actors, primarily in-house within corporations and non-profit organizations, are underexplored—yet increasingly important—partners in intelligence cooperation. Robson’s work on this underexplored field stems from five years of participant observation at thirty public-private and private-led intelligence-sharing meetings and conferences, two surveys of the private sector intelligence community, and 80 interviews with private and public sector intelligence practitioners.

This research makes two important contributions to the intelligence cooperation literature. First, it examines the drivers of trust formation. Existing scholarship tends to explain long-term cooperation by invoking “trust” without defining it. Explaining intelligence cooperation through “trust” is valid but insufficient. What drives this trust, and under what conditions does it endure? Robson’s dissertation project drew on the robust debates
over trust within psychology and political science, concluding that the definition of trust as encapsulated interest is closest to the phenomenon observable within intelligence cooperation: partners share most when they can identify mutual interests and determine credibility within small groups, drawing on track records of reliability or indicators of potential future trustworthiness. Without trust, cooperation is likely to manifest as tactical information sharing rather than strategic cooperation. The research delved into several institutional models of public-private and private-private intelligence sharing to determine patterns of trust formation.

The second key contribution is a focus on transnational ties. When it comes to mitigating risks to corporate assets and to people, the threat landscape is transnational and so is the response. While public-private partnerships are typically structured around national restrictions, private intelligence practitioners—many of whom previously worked with active clearances in the intelligence community—are building transnational networks. Many practitioners are relieved to be able to share external security threat information with each other without being restricted by country. Private sector intelligence professionals’ ties most closely resemble transnational horizontal networks, which have been identified in other realms of international relations but have not been closely examined in intelligence studies. While there are necessary restrictions on the intelligence community when it comes to sharing with private actors, some models manage to facilitate information exchange based on external security risks to corporations with a national presence, rather than requiring the individuals to hold a certain nationality. The prime example of this is the U.S. State Department’s Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), which many private sector intelligence professionals describe as “the gold standard” for institutionalized public-private security intelligence cooperation.

Robson’s post-doctoral research involves a deeper exploration of transnational intelligence cooperation involving private actors, drawing on the growing literature on transnational social networks. She also is exploring the evolution of non-national security intelligence analysis, drawing on the literature on professions to shed light on the underexplored but rapidly expanding field of private sector intelligence.
Dr. Sukalo's current book project, *The Soviet Political Police: Establishment, Training, and Operations in the Soviet Republics, 1918-1953*, examines the establishment of the Soviet political police—the indispensable pillar of the Soviet polity—in the Union’s western republics from 1918 until Stalin’s death in 1953. The Soviets used the political police, that is the Cheka, OGPU, NKVD-NKGB, and MVD-MGB—the precursor organizations of the KGB—to simultaneously crush all resistance to Soviet rule and to transform once-independent populations into loyal Soviet citizens. By examining internal reports, correspondences, official communiqués, personnel files, and memoirs, her book shows the steps the Soviets took to create an indigenous political police force in the republics and their attempts to recruit and train locals to participate in the policing. While the history of the political police has typically been told via the examination of the decisions of the political elite in Moscow, her book sheds light on the experiences of the men and women who staffed the local branches and helped the Soviets gain control over an unwilling populace. In doing so, it complicates our understanding of the Soviet Union’s most punitive institution and reveals the influence that local actors had on implementing the Kremlin’s policies. Her book draws on eighteen months of archival research she conducted in twelve archives and libraries in Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Ukraine, Canada, and the United States.

Her project makes important contributions that further our understanding of domestic surveillance and policing in the Soviet Union, and is the first to: (1) tell a comprehensive story of the political police that considers the establishment of the institution in the western and southern republics (2) compare and contrast the operations of the political police in the non-Russian republics (3) show that the political police used the information they gathered to inculcate the local population with Soviet values and norms (4) detail the recruitment, training, and disciplining of the ordinary men and women who became part of the political police, and (5) examine the role of women in the political police.

The result is a broader institutional and social history of the Soviet’s domestic intelligence service that considers the complex nature of local-level interests and conflicts while providing a more nuanced view of how the political police contributed to the creation of the Soviet Union. A study of the political police in the non-Russian republics is timely. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the successor countries largely retained the form and practices of the Soviet political police in their foreign and domestic intelligence operations. Simply put, even as most Soviet institutions vanished, the hallmarks of the political police remain intact and highly visible in the current intelligence services across the post-Soviet space.
Mallory Needleman’s doctoral dissertation, tentatively titled “Interpreting a Cold War through the Lithuanian Hot Zone,” will reexamine the first decades of the American-Soviet relationship through a Lithuanian lens. Needleman’s research stems from a late 1950s National Intelligence Estimate which found that, in the Soviet Union the greatest resistance potential was no nowhere higher than in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. As to the most important factor behind Baltic opposition to Soviet Rule, the authors of the Estimate determined it to be the brief period of national independence between the World Wars. Her dissertation will investigate why.

Needleman’s preliminary research finds that for Lithuanians, the eighteen years of independence (1918–1940) were so venerated because of how they were attained. First, they felt an astounding pride of overcoming great obstacles to achieve this feat. In the years following the Lithuanian Act of Independence in February 1918, they fought for recognition of their sovereign government from the West, the East, and the League of Nations while simultaneously defending against political interests and territorial claims by Germans, Poles, and Russians. Though President Woodrow Wilson called on Americans to “vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world” in fact it was the Lithuanians themselves who, on their own, fought for their own right and privilege “to choose their way of life and of obedience.”

For the Russians, the sheer fact that there had been an independent Lithuania directly challenged their sovereignty over the region. For the Americans, it became a tool of influence against the Soviets by targeting their weakness in the Baltics. Needleman’s dissertation will outline how Lithuanians realized their power to leverage their independence by grounding their existence in a moral obligation by larger states to defend small states that was implicit in the self-determination rhetoric espoused by Wilson’s Fourteen Points and the Atlantic Charter. Lithuanians continually applied pressure to the international system by vocalizing the volatile conditions of their autonomy. As a result, Lithuanians defined their hard-fought independence as a testament to surviving against all odds.

Secondly, Lithuanians celebrated the longevity of their independence despite external pressures from larger powers. Needleman’s dissertation will describe how the veritable pride of manifesting their own destiny engendered a patriotic zeal that fueled Lithuanians to actively pursue defensive measures during and after World War II and the Holocaust. Such zeal pronounced itself most dramatically at three different points of time: First, in 1940 when Lithuania was first incorporated into the Soviet Union and they formed an underground anti-Soviet government and established clandestine resistance groups to maintain contact with the West, particularly the Americans. Second, at the onset of the Nazi occupation (1941–1944) when they collaborated with the Nazis as a means of avoiding Soviet rule. And third, immediately following the return of the Soviets in 1944, when for years after they engaged in subversive anti-Soviet operations on behalf of the Americans.
In the end, Needleman’s dissertation will argue how, for states like Lithuania, the early-to-mid twentieth century was not a succession of bookend wars with a respite in-between, as it was for the great powers. Lithuania was not a mere cordon sanitaire. Nor, for that matter, was it a nondescript link in an “Iron Curtain” or just an unassuming borderland in the cold war games that included “containing” or “rolling back” Soviet power. Instead, Needleman will bring to light the role and the relative power of Lithuania, and Lithuanians, in the American-Soviet relationship.

(Mallory Needleman is a PhD Candidate at American University. Her dissertation, tentatively titled “Interpreting a Cold War through the Lithuanian Hot Zone,” defines the history of Lithuania's long-sought independence as a prism through which to better understand the American-Soviet power competition of the twentieth century. She earned her MA in Holocaust Studies at the University of Haifa in Israel.)
Silent Game Book Club was created by Dr. Filip Kovacevic in June of 2020. Since then our group has read nineteen books that fall, broadly, within the category of "spy fiction". Over the last year and a half we have concentrated on reading books that were published in 2020 and 2021. We have found some real gems. We have also been privileged to have three authors join our discussion: James Knights, one of our founding members, who is the author of Soldier Girl Blue, a wonderful civil war spy thriller with links to my hometown; Michelle Butler Hallett, the author of Constant Nobody, a powerful work of historical fiction that details Soviet espionage in the 1930s; and most recently David McCloskey, author of Damascus Station, an excellent and timely spy novel that unfolds against the back drop of the Syrian Civil War. Discussing the writing process with these three authors has been one of the highlights of the club. However, our sessions amongst ourselves--our members include not only scholars and practitioners, but those involved in the entertainment industry--have also opened many interesting avenues of dialogue. We are an eclectic group with fascinating life experiences. We have all learned a great deal over the last year and a half.

Our group has also featured a number of wonderful spy novels written by women. These books include: Laura Prescott, The Secrets We Kept; Cara Black, Three Hours in Paris; Ariel Lawhon, Code Name Hélène; Lauren Wilkinson, American Spy; Mai Jia, The Message; Alma Katsu, Red Widow, Kathy Wang, Imposter Syndrome and Our Woman In Moscow by Beatriz Williams. It has been inspirational to see the shifts in contemporary spy fiction away from the iconic "Jack Ryan" characters to more nuanced, strong female protagonists.

Next year we will be concentrating on members favorite books from the past. Our first book will be Frederick Forsyth's The Fox. We will be meeting on January 25th at 12:00 noon on zoom. If you are interested in participating in the book club please E-mail a copy of your CV to Filip at fkovacevic@usfca.edu.
Perhaps more than ever before, intelligence historians are relying on digital resources for materials in their research. With many archives having been closed for more than a year and now only cautiously reopening, this reliance seems almost certain to continue. While NASIH cannot capture everything that has been made available in recent years, we would like to point out two digital declassifications related to Vietnam that might have been overlooked in the past eighteen months. We also welcome your contributions regarding digital resources as well as access strategies that you have found productive.

The Tet Offensive declassification, begun in 2018 by the Director of National Intelligence and completed in 2019, resulted in the release of 1151 documents by four different agencies: the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. Most documents are contemporary to the event and include both (1) brief reports on specific activities or events; and (2) all-source analyses that wrap up or assess intelligence on a specific day’s developments. Some documents were written years or even decades later and offer a historical perspective. Many are redacted to a greater or lesser degree. The documents will be of interest to students of the Vietnam War and shed particular light on the intelligence provided to policymakers and military commanders before and during Tet. They also will be of interest to those seeking to understand the nature, strength, and limits of American intelligence capabilities in the late 1960s, as well as to those curious about the conduct of intelligence operations, particularly but not only signals intelligence.

The full set of Tet Offensive documents can be found at the first link, below. The second link will take you to the DNI’s Tet Offensive homepage, which contains useful background information and other materials.

https://www.intelligence.gov/tet-declassified/tet-declassified-documents
https://www.intelligence.gov/tet-declassified

In advance of the Tet Offensive Declassification, the National Security Agency separately declassified a set of documents related to the final stages of the Paris Peace Talks, in late 1972 and early 1973. The largest document in this set is over 250 pages and contains verbatim translations of 83 cables from November and December 1972 between South Vietnamese diplomats in Paris or Washington and their superiors in Saigon. A separate set of 30 cables from January 1973 also was declassified. The materials summarize South Vietnamese perspectives on the negotiations as well as their engagements with their American counterparts. In several instances, South Vietnamese diplomats detail meetings documented separately by American officials in memoranda that ultimately were included in the series Foreign Relations of the United States, thus offering the contemporary historian an opportunity to compare how the two sides understood specific sessions. They also offer insights into those points that South Vietnamese diplomats chose to relay to Saigon. Finally, while the documents are moot on how senior U.S. officials reacted to this clandestine window into South Vietnamese attitudes, they do show what information they secretly had access to.

NSA’s declassification of documents related to the Paris Peace Talks can be found at the below link. The agency has not indicated whether it plans to release earlier materials related to the negotiations.

Donald Rumsfeld's Snowflakes, Part II: The Pentagon and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2004-2006

"The product of a National Security Archive Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit, this is the second of a two-part series that contains every known “snowflake” memo Donald Rumsfeld circulated during his tenure as Secretary of Defense to President George W. Bush – over 59,000 pages in all. These unvarnished internal memos offer an extraordinary schematic of U.S. defense and national security policy from a tumultuous period, as well as insights into one of the Bush administration’s more memorable characters."

https://proquest.libguides.com/dnsa/57

Donald Rumsfeld's Snowflakes, Part I: The Pentagon and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2001-2003

"Donald Rumsfeld’s “snowflakes” are a unique resource, coming directly from the Defense Secretary’s desk. This first tranche provides unprecedented insight into the workings of the Pentagon during the early years of the Bush administration. The collection offers glimpses into Rumsfeld’s day-to-day concerns covering everything from relations with Russia, China, and other nations to DOD's strategy and conduct in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to communications with the White House and battles with the Pentagon bureaucracy."

https://proquest.libguides.com/dnsa/56

U.S.-Cuba: Secrets of the 'Havana Syndrome'

"The Trump administration’s response to the mysterious health episodes experienced by intelligence and diplomatic personnel in Havana, Cuba, in late 2016 and 2017 was plagued by mismanagement, poor leadership, lack of coordination, and a failure to follow established procedures, according to a formerly secret internal State Department review."


"Prepared by the CIA and delivered to the president each day, these documents were used to brief Presidents Nixon and Ford on world events and global threats, including détente, Ostpolitik, and the thawing of East-West relations; Middle Eastern conflicts, such as the Yom Kippur War, the Jordan Crisis, and the Lebanese civil war; U.S. actions in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos; conflicts in Africa and Indonesia; Latin American political upheavals; and international monetary developments."

https://proquest.libguides.com/dnsa/dnsa_55

Upcoming:

CIA Covert Operations, Part IV: The Eisenhower Years, 1953-1961

"This collection will focus on a highly active, if checkered, period in the history of the Central Intelligence Agency, during which President Dwight D. Eisenhower authorized numerous clandestine programs around the world."

https://proquest.libguides.com/dnsa/58
Continued...

Status of the Foreign Relations of the United States Series (FRUS):
  https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/status-of-the-series

Canadian International Council
- "We now know... a little bit more: Canada’s Cold War defectors"
  - "Recently opened after Access to Information Act requests made by the Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project, a number of records cast brighter light on this aspect of Canada’s intelligence history. This article offers an overview of how the Government of Canada established its policy to manage defection and those who defected."
  https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00207020211016451

Canada Declassified- University of Toronto
- "Military Actions – Peacekeeping – Special Forces – United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) Intelligence Reports"
  - "This briefing book includes eight (8) volumes of records declassified by Library and Archives Canada. These volumes contain intelligence summaries sent from National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) to Canadian units in theatre, as well as to various Canadian commands, other government departments, and allies."
  https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/exhibits/show/unprofor-intelligence-reports/unprofor-intelligence-reports

- "But the Story Was True": A Research Note on Canadian Intelligence Activities in Vietnam"
  - "Recently declassified records reveal new information and confirm old assumptions about Canadian intelligence activities in Vietnam during the 1950s and 1960s."

"Getting to Know the President by John Helgerson provides unique insights into the mechanics and content of the briefings of presidential candidates and presidents-elect, the interaction of the participants, and the effects of briefings on the relationships presidents have had with their intelligence services. Helgerson’s observations on how and what to brief during the campaign and transition periods are essential reading for members of the IC charged with that responsibility in the future and seeking to learn from the best practices of their predecessors."


The National Archives

"JFK Assassination Records – 2021 Additional Documents Release"

"The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) is processing previously withheld John F. Kennedy assassination-related records to comply with President Joe Biden’s Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on the Temporary Certification Regarding Disclosure of Information in Certain Records Related to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy, requiring disclosure of releasable records by December 15, 2021. The National Archives has posted records online to comply with these requirements."

https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/release2021


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President Calder Walton Calder is Director Research of Harvard Kennedy School's Intelligence Project, where he is also Assistant Director of the Belfer Center's Applied History Project. He is currently undertaking two major research projects: first, he is completing a book about British, US, and Soviet intelligence in the Cold War. In addition, Calder is general editor of the multi-volume Cambridge History of Espionage and Intelligence to be published by Cambridge University Press in 2022. Over three volumes, with 90 chapters by leading scholars, this project will be a landmark study of intelligence, exploring its use and abuse in statecraft and warfare from the ancient world to the present day. Calder has published widely on the history of intelligence and international relations, and frequently speaks at universities, think-tanks, and government agencies on both sides of the Atlantic. His work has also appeared in leading print and broadcast media, such as Foreign Policy and War on the Rocks. Ph.D. Director Research, Intelligence Project; Assistant Director, Applied History Project (Harvard Kennedy School of Government).

Vice-President Sara Bush Castro Ph.D Sara is an Assistant Professor at the Department of History, United States Air Force Academy. She received her Ph.D in 2017 from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Prior to that she worked as an intelligence analyst between 2003 – 2009. Ph.D. Assistant Professor, United States Air Force Academy.

BOARD:

Timothy Sayle Timothy is Assistant Professor of History and Director of the International Relations Program. He is the author of Enduring Alliance: A History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order (Cornell, 2019). He has co-edited two volumes: with Jeffrey A. Engel, Hal Brands, and William Inboden The Last Card: Inside George W. Bush’s Decision to Surge in Iraq (Cornell, 2019); and with Susan Colbourn, The Nuclear North: Histories of Canada in the Atomic Age (University of British Columbia Press, 2020). His research on NATO, Canadian-American relations, and intelligence issues has been published in Canadian Military History, Cold War History, Intelligence & National Security, International Journal, International History Review, Historical Journal, International Politics, The Journal of Strategic Studies, and in several edited books. Professor Sayle is a Senior Fellow of the Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary International History, an affiliate of the Centre for the Study of the US, and an associate of the Center for Presidential History at Southern Methodist University. He is a Fellow of Trinity College and alumnus of Massey College. Graduate and undergraduate students at the University of Toronto have worked with Professor Sayle to build Canada Declassified, a web repository of recently declassified archival records. This project has been supported by a SSHRC Insight Development Grant and a Connaught New Research Award. Professor Sayle is a project leader of the Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project.
M. Kathryn Barbier  Distinguished Visiting Professor, United States Air Force Academy (2021-2022) is a professor of History at Mississippi State University. She is a scholar of the Second World War with a particular focus on the Normandy invasion, deception, and double agents. Her first book, *D-Day Deception: Operation Fortitude and the Normandy Invasion*, was published in 2007. Her most recent publication, *Spies, Lies, and Citizenship: The Hunt for Nazi Criminals* (2017), focused on the efforts of the Office of Special Investigations, Department of Justice, to investigate potential Nazi criminals who lived in, or passed through, the United States. Her current research is on a WWII female double agent, whose work, while short, contributed to Operation Fortitude, the deception cover plan for the Normandy invasion. In addition to teaching undergraduate and graduate students and publishing her research, she has presented her scholarly work at numerous conferences. Dr. Barbier is also a member of the Society of Military History’s Board of Trustees, co-director of the Second World War Research Group, North America (SWWRG, NA), co-editor of War in History, and co-series editor of a six-volume Cultural History of War. PhD. Professor, Mississippi State University.

Scholar/Practitioner: David Sherman (B.A. Duke; Ph.D Cornell) retired from the Federal Government’s Senior Executive Service in 2017. He served for 32 years at the National Security Agency, where he held a variety of managerial, analytic, and staff positions. Dr. Sherman also was assigned to the staffs of the National Security Council and National Economic Council, represented NSA to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and – from 2007 to 2010 – was Dean of Academic Programs and Visiting Professor at the National War College. Prior joining the government, he was Adjunct Faculty at Cornell University, where he taught for four years. Dr. Sherman is the author of several studies on the history of American signals intelligence, including *The First Americans: The 1941 U.S. Codebreaking Mission to Bletchley Park* (2016) and *Ann’s War: One Woman’s Journey to the Codebreaking Victory over Japan* (2019). Ph.D. United States Senior Executive Service (Retired).

NASIH Treasurer: Michael Miner has taught at Harvard University for over a decade including courses on intelligence, cyberspace, strategy, and international security. He is an Associate with the Intelligence Project in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. He holds a particular interest in bureaucratic reform including the role of intelligence in policymaking. Michael earned his PhD at King’s College London studying with the Official Historian of the British Joint Intelligence Committee. The *Perennial Quest: Intelligence Integration from London to Washington 1936–2019* examines the historical evolution of national intelligence systems in the United Kingdom and the United States.
Michael Miner (continued) Outside of teaching Michael speaks to various audiences and organizations on current affairs and advocates for matters of public interest. He also holds a term appointment on the Fulbright Specialist Roster supported by the U.S. Department of State and volunteers in the United States Marine Corps Cyber Auxiliary. Dr. Miner is the Secretary of the Board of Directors of the Massachusetts Fulbright Association, is an active member of the North American Society for Intelligence History, and is a graduate of Dartmouth College.

Ex-Officio: Dr. Sarah-Jane Corke is an associate professor at the University of New Brunswick where she teaches a number of courses on American intelligence. Her first book, *US Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy: Truman, The CIA and Secret Warfare* was published by Rutledge in 2008. Dr. Corke has also published articles in the *Journal of Strategic Studies, Intelligence and National Security*, and *The Journal of Conflict Studies*. She is currently working on a number of projects including: a biography of John Paton and Patricia Grady Davies; an edited collection on the International Spy Museum with Mark Stout; an edited collection on Western Covert Operations against the East with Stephen Long and Francesco Cacciatore; and an edited collection on Philosophy and Intelligence Practice with Jason Bell.

**EXECUTIVE TEAM:**

**Graduate Student Representative:** Mallory Needleman is a PhD Candidate at American University. Her dissertation, tentatively titled “Interpreting a Cold War through the Lithuanian Hot Zone,” defines the history of Lithuania’s long-sought independence as a prism though which to better understand the American–Soviet power competition of the twentieth century. She earned her MA in Holocaust Studies at the University of Haifa in Israel.

**NASIH Administrator:** Sabrina Volpe is a graduate of the MS in Geospatial Intelligence program from Johns Hopkins. Her academic research on port security has been featured in the USGIF GEOConnect 2020 Student Showcase. She has worked as a research contractor identifying trends in Great Power Competition as part of the National Defense University's *Strategic Assessment 2020: Into a New Era of Great Power Competition*. Sabrina is currently a GIS contractor for Orbital Insight.
This newsletter was edited by Sabrina Volpe. Each article is reviewed by two members of our board. NASIH invites all members to contribute items of interest, notifications, reviews and articles to the newsletter. If you have an idea for the newsletter that you would like to share with us, please send a short description or abstract to SocietyIntelligenceHistory@gmail.com. Please also feel free to pass along notifications of conferences, calls for papers, and other short items that may be of interest to the whole membership to SocietyIntelligenceHistory@gmail.com.

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