A Note from our President
Sarah-Jane Corke

When Mark Stout and I sat down and decided to create a scholarly organization dedicated to the study of intelligence, we could not have imagined that four years later the world would find itself immersed in a global pandemic. But that is where we are and there appears to be no clear end in sight. With that in mind, NASIH has spent a lot of time thinking about how we could stay relevant in this new world.

Our first objective was to make sure that those who had offered to present papers at our conference, which we were forced to cancel, had a place to present their work. On April 2nd we initiated our Brown Bag series. Since then we have had twelve presentations that have included articles in progress, published articles and books. On average we have had thirty participants in each of the sessions. We are now booked through May of 2022. If you are interested in participating in a brown bag please email us nasintelhist@gmail.com

Our next initiative literally fell in our lap when Filip Kovacevic approached us and offered to run a fiction book club. We could not have been more thrilled. To date we have had four meetings of our Silent Game Book Club with an average of twenty participants. If you are interested in participating please email Filip at fkovacevic@usfca.edu.

NASIH is also proud to support a second initiative by Filip Kovacevic and Kevin Riehle, The Soviet History Research Group. The group is designed to provide an online interactive discussion group for those who study Soviet Intelligence History. The first meeting is scheduled for Friday, January 15, 2021 at 2:00 PM Eastern. Please contact Filip at fkovacevic@usfca.edu or Kevin Riehle at Kevin.Riehle@dodis.mil for more information.

Our last initiative, and perhaps the one closest to my heart, has been the support NASIH has given to the new Women’s Intelligence Network (WIN) that was organized by Aviva Guttmann. It started with a tweet but WIN has quickly become a phenomenon onto itself, with over 150 members in only a few months. If you are interested in joining WIN please email aviva.guttmann@kcl.ac.uk.

It has been a tough year for all of us but NASIH has seized the opportunity afforded to it by the unique circumstances we have found ourselves in, and we have grown and prospered. We want to thank you for your continued support.
About NAISH

The North American Society for Intelligence History (NAISH) was formed in the summer of 2016 by Sarah-Jane Corke and Mark Stout. Our goal was to encourage and support the study of intelligence history in Canada and the United States and to highlight the accomplishment of those in our field.

Times of Challenge and Opportunity by Vice President Calder Walton

First and foremost, we hope that this finds all members of our Society healthy and well. Like everyone, the North American Society for Intelligence History (NAISH) has found the previous months during the coronavirus pandemic challenging and requiring us to make some tough decisions. After careful consideration, we decided to postpone our annual conference, due to take place in Canada in the autumn of 2020, until the autumn of 2021, when hopefully some sort of normalcy has returned to our daily lives. However, a silver lining of the pandemic has been that, like others, we have moved into the virtual world. We have turned the challenges of the pandemic into an opportunity to broaden our horizons and do things that would not have been possible if we had remained solely conducting meetings in person. After the coronavirus pandemic took hold, NAISH decided to launch a brown bag lunchtime discussion series, which takes place via zoom, every two weeks. So far, we have enjoyed a range of hugely stimulating discussions. The society has also helped to launch an intelligence fiction book club. Further details are on our website. In this newsletter, we have decided to highlight recent developments in intelligence history both from a practitioner’s perspective, a practitioner turned academic, and an academic. We have also included a short piece about the future, and challenges, of the publishing industry in the wake of the pandemic. We hope that you find them stimulating.

Statement of Support for Equality and Anti-Racism

NAISH would also like to take this opportunity to express our support for equality across society—in terms of gender, race, religion, and every other facet of life. In particular, we would like to support those exercising their constitutional rights to protest against racism and injustice. The United States is at a moment of crisis, combining what feels at times like the 1918 flu pandemic, the Great Depression of the 1930s, and civil unrest in 1968. And we hope something more just and equal will emerge. We feel that one way to do so to look back at history, to draw lessons from the past, and to avoid repeating the same mistakes.
Are You Interested in Joining the Women's Intelligence Network?

The Women’s Intelligence Network (WIN) connects, supports, and promotes female scholars who work in the field of Intelligence Studies. The overall goal is to get more research by and on women promoted, supported, and elevated in Intelligence Studies. WIN organises brown-bag lunches every first Wednesday of the month (started in September 2020), awards the annual Polly Corrigan Prize for the best publication in Intelligence Studies by a female author, runs a (wo)mentoring programme, meets regularly at conferences, and works towards gender-inclusive syllabi in Intelligence Studies. During a time when there is still a strong gender imbalance within the field of Intelligence Studies, WIN hopes to bring research by and on women to greater prominence. More information about WIN and the brown-bag lunch schedule can be found here: https://kisg.co.uk/win

To Join: Membership is free, and the network welcomes people of all gender identities and sexual orientations as members. If you are interested in becoming a member of WIN, you can send an email to womenintelnetwork@gmail.com with your current position, research interests, and email address. You will then be added to the mailing- and membership list.

Soviet Intelligence History Research Group

Members should be willing to share their research into Soviet intelligence history. They can share: Topics they are working on at the time or their projected research; Questions on which they need support in relation to their research; Research resources to inform other members about (useful archives, recent publications, valuable research contacts); Successes and challenges in researching Soviet intelligence (new revelations or connections, successes or struggles in accessing Russian archives, etc.); Their own publications. Members may bring a recent publication or a research proposal to a meeting and propose that the members read it and prepare notes on it for discussion during the next meeting. Members should be respectful and polite to each other. **To join the SIHRC you must speak Russian.**

The co-founders of SIHRG are Professors Kevin Riehle and Filip Kovacevic. Kevin Riehle is an associate professor at the National Intelligence University. He has spent over 29 years in the U.S. government as a counterintelligence analyst studying foreign intelligence services. He received a PhD in War Studies from King’s College London, an MS in Strategic Intelligence from the Joint Military Intelligence College, and a BA in Russian and Political Science from Brigham Young University. He has published on a variety of intelligence and counterintelligence topics, focusing on the history of Soviet and Eastern Bloc intelligence services. Filip Kovacevic (PhD, University of Missouri, 2002) is an adjunct professor in the Departments of Politics and International Studies at the University of San Francisco, where he was the first to design and teach a course in intelligence studies. He has lectured and taught at universities across Europe, the Balkans, the former USSR, and the U.S., including two years at the first liberal arts college in Russia, Smolny College of Liberal Arts and Sciences in St. Petersburg. Dr. Kovacevic specializes in Russian and Eurasian intelligence history and spy fiction and his current research includes the publications of Soviet and Russian intelligence authors and historians.

Those interested in becoming members of the Soviet Intelligence History Research Group should email Kevin Riehle (Kevin.Riehle@dodiis.mil) or Filip Kovacevic (fkovacevic@usfca.edu) by December 31, 2020 with a short description of their professional background.
Reflections of a One-Time Official Historian of Intelligence

BY WESLEY WARK

Writing official histories of intelligence services can be a tricky enterprise with many hurdles to navigate. If you are selected for the task, there are serious security clearances to be acquired, questions of access to records, discoveries to be had about the state (and organisation!) of extant historical documents, persistent concerns about the willingness of sponsoring agencies to allow for truly independent writing, the waywardness of project champions, and often the overwhelming complexity of the task. Once you get closer to the finish line, the official historian will face challenges around redactions on national security grounds, approvals for publication, commercial demands on the part of publishers. There will always be the skepticism of academic colleagues and an uncertain reception. Writing official histories of intelligence can be a lonely job.

I doubt if anyone has ever tried to collect the experiences of the small band of official historians of intelligence, from F.H. Hinsley’s magisterial multi-volume history of British intelligence in the Second World War, the first volume of which was published in 1979, down to a recently cut off at the knees project for a two volume history of the Australian Signals Directorate, which was originally meant to have been authored by John Blaxland, a veteran of an earlier official history of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO). I have never really talked about this with any of my peers. But prompted by NASIH colleagues, I am going to have a go at some reflections on a little-known project that I undertook over twenty years ago.

In 1998, I was asked to write an official history of the Canadian intelligence community during the formative decades of the Cold War.

While internal histories had been written of the RCMP Security Service (as a centennial project!) and of the Communications Branch of the National Research Council, the predecessor to the signals intelligence agency renamed in 1975 as the Communications Security Establishment, no outsider or mere civilian had ever been asked to undertake such a project. Nor had a multi-agency history ever been contemplated. There was virtually no published literature on the history of the Canadian intelligence community in the post-1945 period at that time (other than Government Commissions of Inquiry). The published literature that did exist focused exclusively on domestic security. Open archival sources were almost non-existent. The Canadian Access to Information Act, with its wide-bore national security exemptions, had effectively sealed the Canadian intelligence archive. This suited the agencies in the Canadian security and intelligence community just fine.

Paradoxically, it was the parlous state of Canadian intelligence studies that provided an important stimulus for the official history project. The idea of an official history was the brainchild of a senior official at the Canadian Privy Council Office, Tony Campbell, who was in charge of the strategic assessment unit in the PCO (the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat). In the course of trying to find a place for intelligence assessments in the
Canadian government in a post-Cold War, peace-dividend world—no easy task—Mr. Campbell grew fascinated by questions about the origins and evolution of the Canadian intelligence community, and wanted to see if there were lessons embedded in that history. He was also sitting on a small gold mine of historical records at the PCO, stored for unknown reasons on one of the floors of his office, which contained some of the key committee documents telling the story of organisational struggles and outlooks on intelligence as Canada sought to create its first peacetime intelligence system after 1945. Two of his officers had surveyed the records and declared them promising, but they had day jobs and were not trained historians. So Tony sought me out at the University of Toronto, where I was teaching courses on intelligence, and doing research and writing. At that time, and alas today, the number of Canadian academics teaching and writing on intelligence could be counted on the fingers of one, maybe two, hands.

I had no hesitation in taking on the task. It struck me as exciting, challenging and with a valuable public purpose. There was the definite lure of entering the world of secrets, known to all who join the profession of intelligence. More soberly, my reflection at the time was that writing an official history of Canadian intelligence was the only way to write a history at all, given the generally parlous state of intelligence literature in Canada, the extreme scarcity of public records, and the miserliness and ultimate futility of the Access to Information system.

Because no such history had been attempted before, there were no existing rules of the road. Few were set out for the project I embarked on. There was agreement that I would gain an “exotic” security clearance, would have access to departmental and agency records, and would write a narrative that would be published. But it was a minimalist road map. I was, essentially, on my own. I had no government minders and no project help, for better or worse. An advisory committee existed on paper, but hardly ever met and exerted no influence on the project. I faced no deadlines, other than self-imposed ones. I could decide when drafts were ready for review. This might strike readers as extraordinarily free-wheeling, and so it was. At the time it seemed to fit the circumstances. The official history project was an experiment with tenuous support across the Canadian security and intelligence community. I can recall feeling that any more rigid or structured approach would have prevented the project from getting approval at all.

The project was launched in the Fall of 1998. Another unusual feature was that it was meant to be conducted part-time, with me alternating between teaching at the University of Toronto and exchange leaves, where I could devote myself to the project, the only financial model available. So I shuttled between Toronto and Ottawa and spent more time than I would have liked in hotel apartments.

The first order of business was to search out the records and make myself known to elements of the security and intelligence community. If there was no project road map, there was certainly no existing guide to the historical records. Members of the advisory committee did assist me here by helping open the doors of their agencies. Some were extraordinarily helpful; some had excellent systems of records management; others were more hesitant, more uncertain about the lay of the land of historical records, or simply more restrictive in terms of allowing me access. I was dismayed to discover that a whole swath of government records related to the work of the military’s intelligence directorates (army, air force and navy) had been destroyed, apparently in the aftermath of service reunification in 1968. The archival landscape proved a patchwork. Few serving officials in the Canadian community had any real idea of the history of their organisations, and few cared. Historical staff working for security and intelligence agencies were rare birds.
I had one key advantage, which was easy access to the valuable records stored at the Privy Council Office detailing the work of the key committees charged with the management of the Canadian intelligence system after 1945. They provided a roadmap of their own to the key issues confronting Canadian officials. As an aside, it is worth nothing that many of these records, even those dating back to the 1940s, still remain closed to public research. A former official of the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat, Alan Barnes, who in retirement created and heads the Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project, has mounted a frontal Access to Information assault on these records over the past few years with mixed results.

Armed with my exotic security clearance I was able to review classified records that had been preserved and transferred to the National Archives of Canada (then called Library and Archives Canada) but remained under lock and key because they retained their original security markings. I owe a debt of gratitude to the federal archivists in Ottawa for their superb help. They oversaw some real treasures. Among the intelligence agencies I worked with the most responsive and forthcoming was, to my initial surprise, the Communications Security Establishment, Canada’s signals intelligence agency. This reflected the fact that the leadership of CSE at the time supported the project, and understood the central role that CSE’s predecessor (the Communications Branch of the National Research Council) had played in building the Canadian security and intelligence system.

Patchwork access may have played a role in the shape of the history that resulted. The project focus came to be dominated by three narratives: the organizational evolution of the Canadian system, including key internal debates; the development of Canadian signals intelligence after 1945; and the effort to produce strategic intelligence assessments of global developments. If this is where the available and richest records led me, it was also.

I believe, the stories that most needed telling. Organisational history may sound boring, but proved in fact a fascinating arena of contending ideas about intelligence, visions of Canadian power, personalities, and bureaucratic struggles. The Canadian intelligence system that was created after 1945 was shaped around the conduct of signals intelligence as a key Canadian asset linked to our membership in a global intelligence alliance now called the Five Eyes. That story had to be opened up. The effort to develop independent strategic assessments was a key marker of the maturity of a Canadian culture of intelligence in Ottawa and of efforts to better use intelligence capabilities to inform decision-making. Curiously, the assessment effort began with an effort to understand Canada’s own north. Purely domestic security intelligence activities, for the time frame of my study the purview of the RCMP’s security service, were not the focus of my study, partly on practical grounds, partly because domestic security intelligence was not a main driver for the creation or evolution of the Canadian intelligence system after 1945 and really operated at its periphery. There was one fun-to-write chapter detailing proposals for a Canadian foreign intelligence service (an idea that went nowhere then and hasn’t gotten very far since).

The original time frame for my history project was three years (1998 to 2001), or effectively 1.5 years of full-time work on my part. Given lack of supporting resources, the time investment needed simply to identify record holdings, and the extent of some of the records, this time frame proved completely inadequate. I suppose the cautionary lesson here is that railroad timetables for official histories are not a good idea. In the event, I found ways to continue with the project after the three year horizon, but other developments began to intrude.

One key loss was the retirement from government service of the original champion of the project, Tony Campbell. A second factor was the vastly altered security
environment that confronted Canada after the 9/11 attacks, which diminished whatever interest there existed among intelligence community officials in an official history project.

The idea of a study of the origins of the Canadian peacetime intelligence system could seem decidedly quaint after 9/11 and certainly not a priority. Most importantly, the original intent to allow for publication of the history was called into question and eventually abandoned, for reasons never fully clear to me. The hammer blow was dealt by the agency that had originally been most supportive of the project, the Communications Security Establishment, when a senior official of that organization reviewed the draft chapters and decided that all material related to the post-1945 history of Canadian signals intelligence could not be released for publication. This sucked the life blood out of the project. I will remain forever puzzled by this decision, not least because the narrative of the post-1945 evolution of Canadian signals intelligence was decidedly a good-news story. An enterprise that was on virtual life support in 1945, developed into a centrepiece of Canadian intelligence by the late 1950s, with unique capabilities, a singular foreign intelligence collection mission, and strong integration with our allies. I guess the secrecy impulse prevailed.

The Canadian official history project never achieved its objective of providing a foundational narrative for a public audience about the evolution of Canada’s peacetime intelligence system, despite my best efforts. Publication was not allowed; draft chapters could not be turned into finished products. The fruits of the project would have been destined for secret cupboards and eventual amnesia had it not been for the vigorous and persistent efforts on the part of a Canadian journalist, Jim Bronskill of the Canadian Press, to force open the manuscript through Access to Information requests. His campaign was launched in 2004 and resulted in the release of a very heavily redacted manuscript. It took until 2019 (21 years after the beginning of the project, and fifteen years after his initial request) for considerably more of the narrative to be released, including sizeable portions of the study of Canadian signals intelligence. This might, I suppose, have been an alls-well-that-ends well story, were it not for the peculiarities of the Canadian access system, which releases records to individual requesters, but does not turn them into publicly accessible documents. The history that I wrote and for which I applied the original security markings, remains, in effect, locked away, subject only to individual ATIP requests to the Privy Council Office. [1]

Would I still advocate for official histories of intelligence, in the light of my experience? The answer is yes, absolutely. If properly seen to the finish line, they benefit from unique and holistic access to records, provide an important historical accounting and can offer a vital foundation for other studies to come. They can play an important role in internal training and cultural formation, and can assist in public education. Intelligence services, like all institutions of government operate on the basis of deeply entrenched practices and norms. Knowing the history is important to success, vital to considerations of future change, and an important way to engage with democratic societies in pursuit of legitimacy. Commissioning official histories of CSIS, since its creation in 1984, and of the more recent decades of the history of CSE would be very valuable. Anniversaries—usable hooks for official histories—for both agencies are coming up. CSIS turns 40 in 2024; CSE turns 80 in 2026.

What lessons would I draw from my long-ago official history project? The key ones are: the need for strong, imaginative and consistent leadership support; clear terms of reference; sufficient resourcing; full access to records; flexible timelines; guaranteed publication; and publicity—establishing a public face to the project from the outset to help anchor it. If some of the considerable freedom I enjoyed in pursuing my history can be sustained, all the better. With all this wind in his or her sails the official historian can then
get down to the real business of making sense of the story.

One final note. Any official historian learns a great deal. I certainly did, including through interactions with serving intelligence officers and classified interviews with intelligence community veterans. It has helped me better understand intelligence culture and systems in all my subsequent work. Despite a deeply unsatisfactory and needless outcome to the official history, I have no regrets. [2]

Notes:

[1] Access to Information requests (only available to Canadian citizens) can be made online to the Privy Council Office for the “History of the Canadian Intelligence Community, 1945-1970” written by Wesley K. Wark. The ATIP online site is: https://atip-airpr.tbs-sct.gc.ca/en/Home/Welcome

[2] Ultimately, parts of the history were published in the form of journal articles and essays. See: Wesley K. Wark, “Creating a Cold War Intelligence Community: The Canadian Dilemma,” in Lars Christian Jennsen and Olav Riste, eds., Intelligence in the Cold War (Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2001); Wesley Wark, “The Road to CANUSA: how Canadian signals intelligence won its independence and helped create the Five Eyes,” Intelligence and National Security, 35, no. 1 (2020); Wesley Wark, “Favourable Geography: Canada’s Arctic signals intelligence mission,” Intelligence and National Security, 35, no. 3 (2020). Kurt Jensen, at the time of my history a serving officer with foreign intelligence experience in the Department of Foreign Affairs, now called Global Affairs Canada, and a member of the advisory group to the project, was able to use some of my material for his Ph.D. thesis and subsequent book, Cautious Beginnings: Canadian Foreign Intelligence 1939-1951 (UBC Press, 2008).

Wesley Wark is currently a senior fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation in Waterloo, where he is leading a project on re-imagining Canadian national security. He teaches professional courses on security and intelligence issues at the University of Ottawa’s Centre on Public Management and Policy. He is a professor emeritus at the University of Toronto.
After a career of practicing intelligence in hostile operating environments across the globe, I was proudly confident of my tradecraft and knowledge of how it could be best applied against an adversary. I studied languages, immersed myself in local cultures, and learned the detailed case histories of assets I would handle. Before a field assignment, I would spend every waking moment preparing for what I hoped would be a successful operational tour. No doubt, the CIA prepared me superbly for the challenges I would face. In the kampungs of Southeast Asia, the grey gloom of back streets behind the Berlin Wall, and in the mountain passes of the Balkans, I learned in situation after situation that my training worked. I knew I could rely on the collective, hard-earned experience of my predecessors handed down in the form of curricula and exercises.

Nevertheless, despite exquisite operational preparation, I was ignorant of how much I didn’t know. My historical frame of reference rarely extended back beyond a few years and decades. I was fully present in the topics and challenges of the moment. Protests, coups, insurgency, and conflict all present the compelling immediacy of agents to be met, communication plans to devise, urgent reports to write. But these events are all rooted in history, and I was sadly deficient in fully appreciating that. One could not fully understand Indonesia in 1985 without understanding the impact of the overthrow of President Sukarno in 1965, or of the start of the independence movement in 1945. Likewise, one could not understand the Indonesian perception of the CIA without being aware of the CIA’s role in covertly supporting separatist movements in the late ‘50s.

With the wisdom of hindsight, I’ve come to appreciate the critical role of historians and academia in exploring the history of intelligence operations and their impact, often experienced as an unseen yet very real gravitational force, on the world around us. Many intelligence agencies, including the CIA, employ professional historians to carefully document their operations and activities. These studies are often objective and can offer a fair critique and analysis. However, internal historical studies suffer from two inherent difficulties.

First, by definition, secret historical studies reach only a very limited internal audience. Cloaked in the classification of the operations they cover, often many decades after the fact, these studies have limited impact because of the narrowness of the readership. Even internal readership tends to be small because of the tyranny of the mission in-box. Unfortunately, time for reflection and historical perspective is not generally prioritized within intelligence agencies under constant pressure to deal with today’s issues and threats.

Second, secret studies are limited by the narrowness of perspective and spoiled by unique access to compelling source material. It would seem counterintuitive to assert that historical perspective is hobbled by excellent source access. However, the HUMINT analogy I would use is that spectacular reporting from a trusted and highly sensitive agent can easily blind analysts to other materials in open source that might contradict the reporting, or at least place it in new light and context. In the same way, internally focused case studies naturally rely on the written and oral records of those who were involved in those operations. The studies can document events in stunningly rich and compelling detail, but rarely are able to offer a truly independent and critical perspective.
This is where intelligence historians step in. Forced to dig, scavenge, and relentlessly press for scraps of information intended to be hidden, they must naturally rely on a wide range of inputs and sources. And once material is collected, they bring the perspective of an outsider in assessing consequence, in contrast to agencies that will naturally overestimate the impact of their activities. Most importantly, intelligence historians take intelligence operations and activities and place them in historical context, something that internal studies are rarely able to do effectively precisely because they are internal.

Some will argue that historical studies of intelligence operations will get much of it wrong because so much critical source material lies hidden. That is undoubtedly true, and I have certainly seen studies which only got part of the story, or which were corrupted by an agenda to fulfill. That said, I more often admire the depth of research, quality of analysis, and the innovative and enterprising approaches used to uncover great source material. Most of all, I’m appreciative of the contributions which intelligence historians make to understand what really happened, presented with objective clarity and insightful analysis. My wish would be that new generations of intelligence operatives learn this more quickly than I did and integrate the historical study of the profession along with all of the other training and lifelong learning requirements of the job.

Paul Kolbe is the Director of the Intelligence Project at the Belfer Center
Reconnecting the Intelligence Studies Ivory Tower with Practicing Analysts

BY DAVID GIOE

There are few chasms as wide between academic study and professional practice as that of intelligence analysis, at least in the United States. It is lamentable that the academic field of intelligence studies is, somewhat paradoxically, in a golden era and yet, simultaneously, has perhaps never had less impact on the professional practice of intelligence analysis. Given the complex, interdependent, and often dangerous world in which we live, this delta between theory and practice is more than simply unfortunate; it is a wasted resource that could lead to intelligence failure. By starting with first principles, recall that the purpose of strategic intelligence analysis is not to draft classified intelligence products on classified systems relying almost exclusively upon classified information. Rather, it is to help decision-makers avoid strategic surprise and to support the policy process by offering analytical products based upon all available sources of information.

Comparisons with other academic disciplines seem to throw the problem into even starker relief. Looking across any university campus to other academic departments, the gap between research and application seems narrower. Those in the fields of engineering, computer science, biology, or chemistry, for example, all seem more confident that their research would have an impact in the real world. Indeed, the private sector and governments both fund much STEM research, even foundational research, with the implicit assurance that any notable developments in the lab will inform future professional practice. While there are of course dangers in an overly cozy association between research and funding, it is past time to narrow the gap between the academic study of intelligence and the American intelligence community. The Intelligence Community Academic Center of Excellence (IC ACE) program is a good start but does not fix the underlying problem of IC analysts being unfamiliar with the relevant and timely contributions made by scholars outside of the IC.

To diagnose the principal barrier between the Ivory Tower and (at least) the USIC, blame the core yet widely held assumption that substantive intelligence analysis relies almost exclusively on classified sources and thus cannot be done outside of classified networks and facilities. In contrast, the ever-growing volume of research done not only in intelligence studies, but also far beyond it in related fields such as political science and across the humanities, should be a critical supplement to traditional all-source intelligence analysis activity. This perspective flies in the face of the conventional view which considers publicly available information as a lesser (and less reliable) contribution to intelligence analysis. That view is justified by a healthy respect for the real advantages that secrecy offers in terms of protecting sources and methods, but it is also motivated by an organizational culture prone to the over-classification of information and by psychological incentives that arise when access to secrets becomes a criterion for intelligence community in-group membership.

For any intelligence community to function optimally, it must consider the contributions of researchers working outside of its intelligence organs. There is an increasing deluge of high-quality unclassified sources that could form the backbone of most intelligence products, and classified sources should, in turn, be used to validate other sources of information as well as fill in granular details for finished products and assessments. Many academic researchers have their own sources of information (which probably do not overlap with USG collection assets to any significant degree), access to private data sets, and research methodologies that, when combined with deep experience and expertise, would stand up favorably to work done by intelligence analysis working from classified sources.
While finished all-source analysis may not be complete without consulting classified sources, a rebalancing is in order to benefit from the world beyond classified information.

While most analysts are taught that the gold standard is “all-source” analysis or “multi-INT” fusion, that often works out to be “all [classified] source” analysis. Even when they avoid this mistake, there remains a tendency for analysts to allow classified sources to have an outsized influence on the report’s bottom line. Thus, classified sourcing tends to have an undue influence on decision-making. History reminds us that a culture that values classified information over open-source information is prone to avoidable mistakes. During the Cold War, for instance, the Soviet intelligence apparatus was quick to dismiss open-source intelligence and placed too much of a premium on intelligence that was gathered by secret means, even when the sourcing was much less reliable. This contributed to the result that Soviet intelligence was first-rate at collection and profoundly dysfunctional at analysis or providing understanding. In short, over- or under-valuing information due to its type of collection is an intelligence failure waiting to happen.

The tendency to overclassify information creates an artificial barrier between intelligence analysts and their natural conversational partners in the Ivory Tower. Thomas Fingar, former Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis and Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, has rightly described an urgent need to “develop and maintain extensive networks of ‘outside experts’...willing to share with the U.S. government...”, and as Susan H. Nelson has argued, academic “outreach is no longer a ‘nice to have’ feature but rather has become a necessary feature of intelligence analysis.”

This lack of outside engagement that Fingar and Nelson identified can be remedied if analysts could (re)discover the world of scholarly production, which can be of direct utility to analysts. For instance, analysts working with other countries’ intelligence services could benefit from a familiarity with the rich academic literature on intelligence liaison. Oil analysts would benefit from engagement with economists studying the energy market or petroleum engineers working on new extraction or refinement technologies. Offerings in intelligence studies, a highly interdisciplinary field, can help analysts on almost every conceivable account deepen their expertise, hone their methodologies, and expose them to the literature of their chosen profession.

As far back as 1955 Sherman Kent identified the salient need for a literature of the discipline of intelligence. Now three major academic journals are devoted to intelligence studies -- not to mention the CIA’s Studies in Intelligence -- and intelligence is a frequent topic in many other leading journals. Analysts might be surprised to learn that their daily work practices are hotly debated by scholars and former practitioners in these journals. For instance, the role and even the very definition of intelligence are not settled concepts. Additional relevant hot topics in these journals include the problems with the “intelligence cycle”, which is taught to new analysts the way the Bible is taught in Sunday school. In the contemporary context, Kent would be pleased to see that a robust literature has now arrived, but he would be dismayed to learn that it mattered so little in the intelligence community.

If analysts could become accustomed to relying on the types of high-quality (and unclassified) research available from the Ivory Tower, they would be less likely to errantly allow the mere secrecy of a source to determine its influence on their all-source assessments. Put another way, they would be able to ascertain the relative value of the information as determined by its ability to plug knowledge gaps instead of by the sensitivity of its source or collection mechanism. Having command of unclassified information would help analysts during information exchanges with foreign partners.
outside academics, the private sector, and even everyday citizens skeptical of governmental intelligence operations. Because analyst professional development has suffered, for a variety of reasons outside the scope of this article, at the same time that unclassified resources have grown in depth, quality, and number, further engagement with the Ivory Tower would help analysts to become acquainted with academic literature relevant to their analytical accounts; specifically, offerings from the Intelligence Studies field. This would help mitigate analyst underdevelopment and also reground analysts in the work that their analytical opposite numbers are doing outside of the IC in think tanks and academia.

In sum, deepened engagement with academic works from leading intelligence scholars would benefit analysts working both functional and regional accounts. And, beyond being useful for analyst professional development, many such works could easily be part of the citation base for current intelligence products. How? An overview of academic resources pertinent to the practice of intelligence analysis should be part of any intelligence agency analytical tradecraft course. Likewise, senior managers, when reviewing analytical products, should query line analysts on what sources they consulted beyond the classified networks. Policies should be implemented to enable analysts to spend a few days a month away from secure government facilities to facilitate interacting with academic resources. This combination would actually improve analytical products by harnessing the synergy that can exist between classified and academic sources. Of course, strategic intelligence analysts ought to use the best of both worlds, but doing so requires a new set of analytical perspectives and habits regarding the utility and applicability of academic information. These can be developed through reconnecting with the Ivory Tower.

David Gioe is an Associate Professor of History at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point
The ongoing coronavirus crisis that upended much of our world struck the American publishing industry at the heart of its business model. As the virus began traveling retail booksellers throughout the country were deemed “non-essential” and therefore forced to close their doors, some to never reopen again. The large retailers who were permitted to operate during the lockdown such as Target and Walmart stocked a few titles to move some units, rather than sell books. Meanwhile, behemoth Amazon, overwhelmed by a huge demand for everything else, put physical books on their back-shelf, delaying those orders until the surge for “necessities” had abated.

This lock-down landscape has had a particularly devastating effect on new titles released after March largely because the preferred way authors reach readers—through in-person appearances—became impossible. Unable to promote their work by way of the traditional ‘bookstore tour’ with readings and audience participation, enterprising authors made efforts to work around these restrictions on-line (e.g. hosting virtual readings, on-line book parties, and social media events). These bookstore substitutes may have created virtual conversations but they did not necessarily boost sales. Sadly, there remains a gap between watching an author and actually buying her book.

Meanwhile, COVID-19 has had a constricting effect on publishers, with many major houses downsizing staff while at the same time growing more cautious in their acquisitions. Put another way, for editors to make an offer on a project pretty much all conceivable doubts arising from the proposal have to be rigorously answered—because the bar is set higher than ever for the acquiring editor lobbying to take on the book. Add to this the absolute uncertainty of the retail landscape when the book will be ultimately released, and you see why publishing is a gambler’s game. In the middle of this casino sits the literary agent discerning which book ideas will work and how to assist authors through the publishing process. Whatever else, the proposal must answer the two questions: Why this book? and Why this author on this subject now?

The bed-rock question Why this book? is elemental at any time but particularly when readers are stressed with little attention span. A project must be relevant and urgent enough to draw attention away from the pandemic which may stay with us for the foreseeable future. Paradoxically, proposals that deal specifically with the coronavirus have been challenging to place; we may be still too early in the crisis to process its impact which needs some distance and perspective. Due to the uncertainty surrounding the pandemic, authors attempting to directly address the subject of COVID face an uphill battle.

Publishers have responded positively to non-fiction which adopts what might be labeled a “high altitude” view of present issues. In a moment when so many are feeling lost, readers are flocking to authority figures, advocates, and experts in the field who offer perspective on timeless themes, including intelligence. Each of us is looking to make sense of our world which bodes well for those historians and political scientists who present “the long view.” Big books will still be with us long after this crisis and are at a premium. This underscores the importance of answering why this author on this subject now? Answer that, and you have yourself a publishing contract.

At present when we need distraction more than ever it comes as no surprise that escapist novels have become even more popular although dystopian tales are challenged (too close to home?). And, bringing it closer to the family, young adult, children’s books,
workbooks, and craft materials (e.g. coloring books) are selling phenomenally well as parents have morphed into home school instructors.

Social upheaval, including recent protests over racial inequality across our country, has had a seismic and long over-due effect on publishing. On the author’s side, authentic writers about the African American and non-white experience in history, science, and politics now find receptive agency among today’s editors. And, on the inside of the publishing business, as the industry combats its own systemic racism, there are calls for those editors to actually be other than Caucasian. The decision-making editorial table will soon evolve into a better reflection of our larger society as publishing champions writers of diverse backgrounds especially those shining light into forgotten corners of our collective experience.

Despite the toll the coronavirus has taken on the publishing industry, one rule remains constant: important stories, including those illuminating the history of intelligence, will find their readers.

Michael V. Carlisle and Michael Mungiello are colleagues at InkWell Management, a leading New York-based literary agency with international clients.
The Spirit of Tehran ‘43: How the Russian SVR Framed its 100th Anniversary Celebration

BY FILIP KOVACEVIC

The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) is celebrating its 100th anniversary this year. The counting goes back to December 20, 1920 and the establishment of the International Department of the VChK-a. It does not take into consideration the fact that the Russian tsarist regime had a well-established network of foreign intelligence agents decades earlier. This is a clear demonstration of the Soviet-oriented mindset still prevailing within the service. This mindset, however, has little to do with the Soviet communist ideology. Instead, it reflects respect for the Soviet Union’s Cold War position as one of the two global superpowers. This is why the SVR’s celebration of its 100th anniversary consists of showcasing what it considers to be Soviet intelligence successes. The SVR narrates the history of the Soviet Union in a way that highlights the contributions that Soviet foreign intelligence made to attaining and maintaining Soviet superpower status. This strategy has met relatively little opposition among the Russian mainstream academic historians considering that the SVR director Sergey Naryshkin is at the same time the president of the Russian Historical Society.

The key historical event that seems to have been chosen for extensive media promotion by the SVR is the first summit of the Big Three (Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin) held in Tehran in late November 1943. According to the SVR interpretation, this summit was a big victory for Stalin because he convinced Roosevelt and Churchill to open the second front in Europe and acquiesce in the Soviet Union’s playing the kingmaker role in post-war Eastern European affairs. Importantly, the SVR seeks to present this outcome as the result of the hard work of Soviet intelligence operatives, especially those operating under no official cover, the so-called illegals. In this respect, the pride of place is assigned to two Soviet illegal operatives, ethnic Armenians, husband and wife Gevork and Goar Vartanyan (1924-2012; 1926-2019). Their alleged claim to fame is that they took part in the Soviet intelligence operation that saved the lives of the Big Three.

The Vartanyan couple first became known to the Russian public in 2000 in an article by Nikolay Dolgopolov, a long-time Soviet and Russian journalist. Dolgopolov has since become one of the most popular Soviet intelligence historians whose books are published in thousands of copies and going through several editions. In 2013, Dolgopolov published a book-length biography of Gevork Vartanyan. It is a slim volume as most operations in which Vartanyan and his wife took part remain classified. The only thing known is that they spent almost thirty years as Soviet illegals in several dozen countries around the world, mostly in Europe and the Middle East. Vartanyan was the recipient of the Hero of the Soviet Union medal in 1984, one of the few Soviet intelligence operatives to be awarded the highest Soviet decoration. Another recipient, for instance, was Ramon Mercader, Trotsky’s assassin. Vartanyan famously claimed that only one point of the five-pointed gold star medal was earned by him, the other one by the Moscow Center, and the remaining three by his wife, Goar. A hotbed of machismo, the KGB had a different view and Goar Vartanyan had to settle for a less prestigious decoration, the Order of the Red Banner. After retirement, in the early 1990s, the Vartanyans were hired as consultants by the newly established SVR to teach new generations of Russian intelligence officers the basics of illegals’ spy craft.

In order to rekindle the spirit of Tehran-43 as the key aspect of its 100th-anniversary celebration, the SVR decided to introduce the exploits of the Vartanyans into Russian popular culture. The SVR Press Bureau director, Sergey Ivanov, contacted an Armenian-Russian detective stories writer Khachik Khutlubyan to write a documentary fiction (‘faction’) novel about the events in Tehran.
In addition to having been given access to the SVR archives, Khutlubyan knew Vartanyan personally. His novel titled The Agent who Outplayed the Abwehr was published by Eksmo, one of the largest Russian publishing companies, which controls close to 40 percent of the Russian book market and annually publishes 120 million books. The novel casts the 17-year-old Vartanyan and his associates in the main role of derailing the alleged German plans to sabotage Churchill’s birthday celebration at the British diplomatic compound in Tehran on November 30, 1943. Curiously, the title refers to the Abwehr, even though the main spymaster of German intelligence in Iran at the time was Franz Mayer, an SS/SD man, a fact acknowledged by the novel’s blurb as well as by Dolgopolov’s biography that Khutlubyan extensively relied on. One can only speculate why the SVR preferred to have the Abwehr rather than the SS in the title.

The SVR made the presentation of the novel in February 2020 into the kick-off event for the start of its 100th anniversary year media campaign. One of the speakers was Yury Shevchenko, another highly decorated Soviet illegal whose name was declassified in January 2020 and who never appeared in public before. Shevchenko knew Vartanyan personally and claimed that he successfully performed an intelligence mission considered impossible and not to be declassified for another 50 years. Nothing is known about this operation except that it involved Soviet illegals, but chances are it took place much later than the 1940s. Perhaps bringing up the name of Vartanyan in public is meant to be a signal to those who might know the secret details of the operation that something along similar lines could happen again. In any case, there is no doubt that the SVR will continue to tout its successes in running illegal agents in the countries of importance to Russian foreign policy throughout this anniversary year and beyond.
Dress, Disguise, and Deception during the Second World War

BY CLAIRE HUBBARD-HALL AND ADRIAN O’SULLIVAN

In the context of conventional warfare, most people associate the term camouflage with the military use of paint or fabric (e.g. camouflage netting and hessian) to disguise and protect large objects such as ships, aircraft, armoured vehicles, and artillery pieces, or structures ranging in size from pillboxes and machine-gun nests to aircraft hangars and entire military bases and oil refineries. In one case, a camouflage officer was despatched from Cairo to the Shatt al-Arab to investigate the possibility of camouflaging an entire coastline to disorient enemy pilots and navigators. To be precise, such applications should correctly be termed macrocamouflage.

Of greater potential interest to intelligence historians, however, is the art and science of microcamouflage, which is associated particularly with the waging of asymmetrical warfare and covert operations. Here too the basic principle is to protect assets by rendering them less prominent and blending them into the background. However, here the objective is to protect secret agents’ true identities by altering their appearance, thereby creating and preserving their operational cover in a way that prevents their detection by the enemy. Similarly, certain small weapons and explosive devices can also be protected by disguising their appearance and concealing their lethality.

In March 2019, the research and writing team of Dr Claire Hubbard-Hall (Bishop Grosseteste University, Lincoln, UK) and Dr Adrian O’Sullivan (Independent Emeritus, Vancouver, Canada), both NASIH members, were awarded a second major Janet Arnold research grant by The Society of Antiquaries (London) to continue their investigation of the use of clothing in clandestine operations. Their brief is to challenge old orthodoxies surrounding secret-agent disguise during the Second World War by focussing on clothing as an essential component of agent microcamouflage and cover identity, throwing light on the use of textiles, design, procurement, manufacturing, and distribution processes, and on a secret agent’s operational experience defined by his/her cover clothing. The ultimate project output is to be the publication of a fulllength monograph with the working title “A Secret Agent’s Wardrobe: Dress, Disguise, and Deception during the Second World War.”

The project objectives to be pursued by Claire and Adrian are: (1) to examine the spaces and sites associated with the design, manufacture, and oversight of secret agents’ clothing; (2) to identify the stages of manufacture and the roles of those individuals involved, such as tailors and seamstresses, as well as refugees in the UK who owned clothing companies; (3) to explore sourcing of materials and production techniques, and associated economic costs; (4) to conduct research on declassified files, as well as agent memoirs, photographs, clothing items, and sound recordings; and (5) to create a permanent documentary and visual record of an important area of history which resonates with current debates surrounding clothing and cover identities within intelligence services worldwide.

Claire and Adrian’s research methodology consists of archival and literary investigations conducted in the UK and the USA. By adopting a prosopographical approach, both researchers combine quantitative and qualitative methods to record and analyse evidence. This enables a range of different sources to be analysed, and through the systematic assembly of fragments of information, a narrative can be constructed.
around agent clothing. Organisational and operational files are being consulted at such institutions as The National Archives (Kew, Surrey) and the National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Maryland). Photographs, items of agent clothing, memoirs, sound recordings, and private papers are also being consulted at the Imperial War Museum (London).

The military organisations that initiated, coordinated, and supervised this extensive covert initiative on both sides of the Atlantic were anything but conventional and were highly secretive: the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) — and to a lesser degree the escape and evasion organisation MI9 — and the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Consequently, it is up to specialised intelligence historians like Claire and Adrian to apply their considerable sleuthing skills to ferreting out the secrets of an area of activity that has hitherto been neglected by conventional military historians and journalists on both sides of the ocean. While the OSS began their own microcamouflage initiative in Washington and New York, it was decided in the lead-up to the Normandy landings to move the entire OSS camouflage undertaking to the organisation’s London headquarters, so as to be closer to the field of operations in Nazi-occupied Europe and to SHAEF headquarters also in London. Procurement, distribution, and manufacture of European clothing for OSS agents was of course greatly facilitated by this transatlantic transfer closer to European sources of supply and expertise. Consequently, wartime London is the primary focus of all research into Allied camouflage operations. However, this only became apparent during preliminary research into sources of information.

As one might expect, strong personalities ruled these domains, and Claire and Adrian have discovered to their delight that the highly innovative men and women who placed their many creative talents at the disposal of the wartime agencies have left us with some stunningly ingenious achievements and inventions in the area of personal camouflage, disguise, and deception. A former film director became SOE’s Director of Camouflage, scouring the British film studios to recruit some extraordinarily talented technicians, tradespeople, artists, and designers, all willing to turn their skills to the creation of cunning deceptive devices and accessories to be used by covert operatives in the field. At the same time, an army of clothing and textiles experts, mostly Jewish refugees who had fled Nazi persecution, worked long hours at various secret London locations to manufacture authentic European clothing which could convince even the most suspicious Gestapo interrogator that it had been purchased locally. Many agents’ lives were spared simply by the fact that they did not arouse suspicion, thanks to their carefully constructed authentic appearance. All across the United Kingdom, manufacturers supplied the raw materials necessary for these enterprises, and part of Claire and Adrian’s remit has been to investigate the hush-hush work of the Ministry of Supply in procuring a wide range of goods and materials for use by the secret services.

The coronavirus has done its worst to push back the production schedule. However, the dynamic duo hope to be able to publish their results in the form of a full-length book in 2022 offering the first academic study of wartime camouflage clothing, exciting researchers working in other fields to pursue new and stimulating research on the design and manufacture of agent clothing in all historical periods.
New Declassified Documents

FALL 2020

From the National Security Archive:
- Inside the Gorbachev-Bush “Partnership” on the First Gulf War 1990
- Allende and Chile: ‘Bring Him Down’
- Putin, Clinton, and Presidential Transitions
  - “Highest-level memcons and cables document Putin’s rise to power. Clinton Library declassifications plus Archive lawsuit open verbatim Clinton-Putin and Clinton-Yeltsin conversations. U.S. emphasis on importance of transfer of power by ballot box gives way to merely endorsing peaceful transition as Yeltsin resigns and anoints Putin in 1999”
- New Light in a Dark Corner: Evidence on the Diem Coup in South Vietnam, November 1963
  - “JFK Was More Inclined toward Regime Change than Earlier Believed. Newly Released JFK Tape and President’s Intelligence Checklists Fill in Gaps in Record. South Vietnamese Leader’s Notes Published for First Time. Written Hours before Assassination”
- Reconnaissance Flights and U.S.-China Relations
- Che Guevara and the CIA in the Mountains of Bolivia
  - “Argentine-born Revolutionary Executed 53 Years Ago. Declassified Records Describe Intense U.S. Tracking of Guevara’s Movements. Initial Doubts about His Death, and Hopes that His Violent Demise Would Discourage Revolutionaries in Latin America”
- In Memoriam: Yuri Fedorovich Orlov, 1924-2020
  - “Mourning a Giant of Physics and Human Rights. Founder of Moscow Helsinki Group. Orlov Proposed “Glasnost” almost 15 Years Before Gorbachev”
- The U.S. Nuclear Presence in Western Europe, 1954-1962, Part II

Status of the Foreign Relations of the United States Series (FRUS):


Fox, Amaryllis. Life Undercover: Coming of Age in the CIA. Knopf (October), 240 pp.


Hashimoto, Chikara. The Twilight of the British Empire: British Intelligence and Counter-Subversion in the Middle East, 1948–63 (Edinburgh University Press, 2019).


Houghton, Vince. Nuking the Moon: And Other Intelligence Schemes and Military Plots Left on the Drawing Board. Penguin, 2019


Kent, Alexander and Kevin Salwen. The Suspect: An Olympic Bombing, the FBI, the Media, and Richard Jewell, the Man Caught in the Middle. Harry N. Abrams (November), 304 pp.


Lockhart, James. Chile, the CIA and the Cold War: A Transatlantic Perspective. Edinburgh University Press (June), 224 pp.


Miller, Donald L. Vicksburg: Grant's Campaign That Broke the Confederacy. Simon & Schuster (October), 688 pp.


O'Sullivan, Adrian. The Baghdad Set: Iraq through the Eyes of British Intelligence, 1941–45. Palgrave Macmillan (May), 326 pp.


NARIH Board of Directors
2020 – 2021

President Sarah-Jane Corke Ph.D. Associate professor, University of New Brunswick. She is the author of US Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy: Truman Secret Warfare and the CIA, Routledge, 2008. She has published articles in Intelligence and National Security, The Journal of Strategic Studies and the Journal of Conflict Studies. She is now working on a biography of John Paton and Patricia Grady Davies.

Vice President Calder Walton is Assistant Director of Harvard Kennedy School's Applied History Project, where he is currently undertaking two major research projects on the history of intelligence, statecraft, and international relations. First, he is completing a book about British, US, and Soviet intelligence in the Cold War. Second, he is general editor of the multi-volume Cambridge History of Espionage and Intelligence to be published by Cambridge University Press. Over three volumes, with 90 chapters by leading scholars, this project will be a landmark study of intelligence, exploring its use and abuse in statecraft and warfare from the ancient world to the present day. Both of these projects build on Calder's previous research at Cambridge University (UK), where he wrote his first book, Empire of Secrets. British intelligence, the Cold War and the Twilight of Empire (2013) and where he was a principal researcher on Christopher Andrew's authorized centenary history of the British Security Service (MI5) Defend the Realm (2009). Calder's research has appeared in leading print and broadcast media on both sides of the Atlantic.

BOARD

John R. Ferris Ph.D. John is a professor of History at the University of Calgary. He is the author of Intelligence and Strategy, Routledge, 2007 and a number of other books on British strategic history. At the present time he is writing the authorized history of GCHQ.


Scholar/Practitioner David Sherman (B.A. Duke; Ph.D Cornell) retired from the Federal Government’s Senior Executive Service in 2017. He served for 32 years at the National Security Agency, where he held a variety of managerial, analytic, and staff positions. Dr. Sherman also was assigned to the staffs of the National Security Council and National Economic Council, represented NSA to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and – from 2007 to 2010 – was Dean of Academic Programs and Visiting Professor at the National War College. Prior joining government, he was Adjunct Faculty at Cornell University, where he taught for four years. Dr. Sherman is the author of several studies on the history of American signals intelligence, including The First Americans: The 1941 U.S. Codebreaking Mission to Bletchley Park (2016) and, Ann’s War: One Woman’s Journey to the Codebreaking Victory over Japan (2019).

NARSIH Treasurer: Sara Bush Castro Ph.D. is an Assistant Professor at the Department of History, United States Air Force Academy. She received her Ph.D. in 2017 from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Prior to that she worked as an intelligence analyst between 2003-2009.

Ex-Officio Mark Stout Ph.D. Mark is a Senior Lecturer and Director of the MA in Global Security Studies at Johns Hopkins University's Krieger Schol of Arts & Sciences Advanced Academic Programs in Washington, DC. He is a former U.S. intelligence officer and former Historian of the International Spy Museum. Mark was President of NASIH from 2016-2019.
NASIH EXECUTIVE TEAM

NASIH Administrator: Sabrine Volpe is a recent graduate of the MS in Geospatial Intelligence program from Johns Hopkins. Her academic research on port security has been featured in the USGIF GEOConnect 2020 Student Showcase. She most recently worked as a research contractor identifying trends in Great Power Competition as part of the National Defense University's Strategic Assessment 2020: Into a New Era of Great Power Competition.

Graduate Student Representative: Mallory Needleman is a second year History PhD student at American University. Mallory earned her MA in Holocaust Studies at Haifa University in Israel. Her broad interests include mid-century Lithuania and its relationship to the United States. She recently presented her research on Stasys Žakevičius at the inaugural NASIH conference this past October.

This newsletter was edited by Sabrina Volpe and Sohan Mewada. Each article is reviewed by two members of our board. If you are interested in submitting an article to the newsletter or have any other information you would like included in the next newsletter please contact us at nasintelhist@gmail.com.

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