The North American Society for Intelligence History was organized to encourage and support the study of intelligence history in Canada and the United States. NASIH formed in the spring of 2016 by Dr. Mark Stout and Dr. Sarah-Jane Corke.

E-Mail us at NASIntelHist@gmail.com

A few words from our President

NASIH is a year old now. It is a good time to take stock. As of this writing, we have some 60 members and we continue to grow. We are also starting to fulfill our goals of serving the community of intelligence historians in North America. Beyond the newsletter, we are preparing to launch our website, www.intelligencehistory.org. Our graduate student representative, Maria Robson, assisted by Elizabeth Bruton, has taken on task of building the site and we owe both of them a debt of gratitude. If you have ideas for how to expand the site or if you have information that should be posted there, please contact Ms. Robson at m.robson@northeastern.edu. We also have a Twitter feed, @socintelhistory please feel free to follow us. In Washington, DC, we have launched a series of Intelligence History Brown Bags. Our first speaker was Ellen Laipson, who talked about the National Intelligence Estimates process. Seth Jones was our second speaker. He spoke on covert action in Poland. Finally we are in the process of organizing our inaugural conference to be held in early 2020. The conference will be held at the new headquarters of the International Spy Museum in Washington D.C.

Mark Stout [mstout4@jhu.edu]

Please contact us if you have any announcements related to the history of intelligence. We are especially interested in conference announcements, book publications, and new document collections that have recently been declassified. If you are interested in contributing an article to the newsletter we would love to hear from you. All articles are peer reviewed by at least two members of our board of directors. Our next newsletter will appear in the summer of 2018. The newsletter is edited by Dr. Sarah-Jane Corke. Contact her at scorke@dal.ca
The Canadian Military Intelligence Association has commissioned University of New Brunswick Professor (ret.) Dr. David Charters to write a history of intelligence support to Canadian Forces (CF) operations from 1970 to 2010. Starting this year, the four-year project is intended to yield a book researched to scholarly standards, but written in a style accessible to the non-specialist and layperson. As currently conceived, the book will examine: the military intelligence function; the impact of the mid-1960s unification and reorganization on CF intelligence; the trends shaping military intelligence from 1970 to the present; evolution of the intelligence function in the CF during that period; and the role and impact of intelligence on CF operations in that era. The focus will be primarily on intelligence at the operational and tactical levels. A considerable amount of original source documentation is already available, and it is hoped that additional material will be declassified to support the project. In addition, Dr. Charters plans to conduct interviews with former military intelligence professionals and those who received and used their products. The author can be reached at: charters@unb.ca

David Charters is a retired Professor of History at the University of New Brunswick. He is the author of a number of books and articles on intelligence history.
For intelligence historians, spy memoirs can be invaluable sources. Scholars might wait decades for the government to declassify key documents, only to find the most important passages blacked out. But if a key player in an espionage game writes a book, then the scholar gets a rare, if one-sided, view into an episode that is otherwise obscure. The substantive points can be revelatory, but even seemingly insignificant details can be “caviar” to a historian, as Christopher Moran says.

Though historians depend on these memoirs, we don’t know much about the process by which they have come to light. Christopher Moran solves this problem in *Company Confessions: Secrets, Memoirs, and the CIA*, which is, as he says, a history of the “secrets of secrecy, so to speak” (7). Based on archival sources in more than forty manuscript collections, *Company Confessions* analyzes the history of the Central Intelligence Agency’s efforts to shape its public image by alternately censoring and assisting the publication of its former agents’ memoirs.

Moran starts his narrative with the story of Herbert Yardley, the cypher office chief from World War I until 1929, when the office was disbanded. Yardley famously published in 1931 an account of his exploits as codebreaker, *The American Black Chamber*, which revealed, among other things, that the United States had been intercepting and decoding secret Japanese messages during the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22. Yardley’s experiences taught his potential successors both that publishing one’s memoirs could be profitable but also dangerous: the U.S. government impounded a sequel to his book and watched him for the rest of his life.

Moran then traces the uneven and eventful subsequent history of American spy memoirs from World War II to the present.
Book Review


Moran shows how CIA leaders responded cleverly to critical congressional investigations and the publication of whistleblowers’ memoirs during the 1970s. On the one hand, the Agency created the Prepublication Review Board – and thus a uniform review process for all writings by current and former agents – in 1976. On the other hand, the Agency embraced a sophisticated public relations strategy that included encouraging former employees – at least those with positive experiences – to write their memoirs. As Moran says, the CIA came to realize “that certain memoirs, at certain times, by certain people, are beneficial” (19).

Former CIA director Richard Helms wrote one of those beneficial memoirs. In fact, Helms started writing during what turned out to be a golden age of CIA openness. In 1996, when John Hollister Hedley took over as chair of the PRB, he signaled that the board would now be more open to telling some of the Agency’s secrets, at least those from decades past. In this spirit of openness, Agency officials sought to help Helms document his long career in the Agency. “So often the bane of the spy memoirist,” Moran writes, “the pre-publication review process was no impediment to Helms” (243). Actually, Moran argues, “The CIA was in fact trying to mould the book as a surrogate official history with the aim of improving public understanding” (246).

However, the golden age did not last. The Hedley era, Moran writes, “proved to be a false dawn in terms of authors receiving a fair hearing from the PRB” (256). After Hedley’s retirement in 1998, the window of opportunity began to close. In 2004, the Agency was rocked by the publication of former counterterrorism expert Michael Scheuer’s Imperial Hubris, which criticized the Bush administration’s policies in the war on terror. Agency officials decided that they needed to take a harder line with memoirists.

Along with his previous monograph, Classified: Secrecy and the State in Modern Britain, Moran’s Company Confessions provides a fascinating glimpse into the public relations dilemmas faced by modern security agencies as they balance their desire for secrecy with their need to maintain public support in a democracy.

By Kathryn Olmstead, Professor of history, UC Davis
NASIH: Congratulations on this remarkable opportunity. Perhaps we should start by asking you about your research process and how it may differ from that used by Christopher Andrew, Keith Jeffery and Michael Goodman in preparing their authorized histories of MI5, MI6 and the Joint Intelligence Committee respectively?

John Ferris [JF]: My position generally is like that of other authorised or official historians of British intelligence: Keith Jeffery—whose early death was a loss to his friends, family, scholarship and humour—Chris Andrew and Michael Goodman. All four of us have had limited direct access to the archives themselves, for which purpose we have had a research assistant. My Virgil is Jock Bruce, an ex GCHQ hand who turned historian after he retired, and with whom I have talked and worked for a decade on the history of signals intelligence. I have signed the Official Secrets Act, but have no formal security clearance. That actually would cause me problems, as GCHQ would vet anything I ever wrote again on signals intelligence. In effect, GCHQ is temporarily creating a class of declassified documents, to which I alone have access, at the moment. When the work is published, the intention is to release most of these documents to The National Archives.

Each of us authorised or official historians of intelligence have had different remits: Keith received complete access to SIS [MI6] archives from 1909-46, but nothing afterward; Chris had complete access to MI5 records between 1909-89; and Mike had complete access to the records of the JIC [Joint Intelligence Committee], and the opportunity to see related material from the British intelligence agencies, up to around 1989. I have complete access to GCHQ records on the matters which I am addressing, and none whatsoever to those which we have agreed that GCHQ will not help me to cover. I also have access to related files held by other departments, like the Foreign Office and The Ministry of Defence. One of my main tasks is to answer the “so what?” question: that is, why did this stuff matter, and to whom? That question
Interview with historian John Ferris Continued

can be answered only when you examine the records of the major consumers, and compare the intelligence record to what actually happened on the ground.

NASIH: Histories are necessarily selective and you are writing about a century-old organization that has a lot of history. How did you select the topics or themes that you would address?

JF: When GCHQ approached me, they knew that they would not give me material on certain matters, and wanted me to address some specific topics. If I had been the one to select those topics, I would have chosen the ones they liked. However, I have extended the chapter on translucency and oversight in ways that I do not think GCHQ expected. It starts in 1815, ends in 2019, and focuses on the development and decline of a culture of secrecy within British government and intelligence agencies; how Whitehall controlled British codebreaking between 1914-90 (which is the way oversight and transparency worked at the time); the traumas faced after 1970 by the most secret agency of a state which generally valued secrecy, as broader cultural and political attitudes changed toward secrecy and trust in the state; and the modern conflict between operational security, and the need to meet demands for oversight and some openness to the public. (By the way, I owe the word “translucency,” which better reflects the degree of openness possible to any sigint agency than does the more common term, “transparency”, to Dave Sherman, who has recently retired from NSA).

I also convinced GCHQ to let me do a chapter I call “Just Who are These Guys, Anyway?” that is, an historical sociological study of GCHQ between 1939 and 1989, with statistics and analyses of issues like race, gender and class; modes of recruitment, promotion and work for people ranging from wireless operators to cryptanalysts and high flyers; the characteristics GCHQ sought among its people, and what these people are like, etc. That is the chapter which most excites me, in fact.

If you look at the list of chapters for the book [available on page 8], you will see, about 25% of the material covers topics where the evidence already is in the public domain.

New From the National Security Archives

New findings on clerical Involvement in the 1953 Coup in Iran from newly declassified sections of the internal CIA History, “The Battle for Iran”. National Security Electronic Briefing Book # 619


CIA declassifies more of “Zendebad Shah!” The Internal study of the 1953 Iran Coup. National Security Electronic Briefing book # 618


The reason is simple: no one has ever systematically presented that material, and general understanding of it is inadequate. If one is to understand the history of GCHQ after 1945, one needs a solid grasp of the development of British signals intelligence between 1898-1945.

NASIH: Did GCHQ place any topics off-limits for you?

JF: GCHQ will not give me access to material on the techniques of cryptanalysis after 1948, or any diplomatic communications intelligence after August 1945. Of course, I am free to use any material in the public domain on those topics. I doubt that I will say much on the techniques of cryptanalysis, though I will make general points, and refer readers to Stephen Budiansky’s *Code Warriors*. There is a fair amount in the public domain about the diplomatic communications intelligence produced by GCHQ and NSA after 1945. I will make general comments on what that evidence says regarding success and targets, and refer readers to its sources. Since I have a chapter on diplomatic communications intelligence between 1919-45, and a few paragraphs on it between 1915-18, the topic itself will be covered adequately, I think, as will be techniques of cryptanalysis up to 1948. Nor will I see operational material from GCHQ on its involvement in military activities, except for the ones in the chapters on the end of empire and on NATO. I also will not see any material on many liaison relations. Finally, most of my chapters end with the Cold War, and the final chapter, which looks broadly at GCHQ between 1989-2019, will rely primarily on material in the public domain. The one exception to that rule will be the chapter on secrecy, translucency and oversight, where I will have access to some related material up to 2019. All told, I have no problems professionally with the areas with which GCHQ is not providing material to me: I have more than enough on my plate already.

NASIH: You mentioned liaison relationships, one of the most difficult topics to study in intelligence history is liaison relationships. Of course, GCHQ is an integral part of the Five Eyes community—US, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Doubtless it also has liaison relationships with other countries. Will you be able to tell any of those stories?

JF: I am writing a chapter on this matter. It is the most sensitive of the topics I am addressing, from GCHQ’s perspective, because of the number and nature of liaison agreements. These relationships are very complex: they are best seen as being like diplomatic and military relations between states in the modern period. Being secret, they also are politically sensitive; past history can have live consequences. At present, I have free access to material on liaison relations with other signals intelligence agencies within the Five Eyes and NATO, the two biggest ones for GCHQ. We are trying to gain cooperation from a non-Five Eyes partner for a section to illustrate this important sort of bilateral liaison relationship, with third parties. However, there are many records on liaison relations which I will not see.

NASIH: You also mentioned declassifications. Neither the MI5 nor MI6 histories have been accompanied by declassifications but I take it that your history of GCHQ will be different in this regard.

JF: This actually is one of the most exciting things about the project, from my point of view. The intention is to release to The National Archives most of the material which I will see, once the book is out. Some files will be retained, and redactions will be made on many records which are released, but within some years after the book is out, so too will be most of the material which I used. Much of the British signals intelligence record from the Cold War will be in the public domain. Anyone who wants to check or challenge my interpretation will have the chance to do so.

NASIH: What would you say to the critique that official and authorized histories are necessarily going to paint rosy pictures of their subjects?
JF: GCHQ want an authorised history for several reasons: intellectual, institutional and political. Given the secrecy which surrounded signals intelligence until recently, siginters did not know their own history, which actually hampers their work, in some ways. Over the past generation, both GCHQ and NSA have debated internally the need to reshape the balance between secrecy and openness. These agencies recognised the increasing public demand to know more about work done in their name, and thought that, generally, siginters had a good news story to tell. When it comes to work against foreigners, that practice is much less gray than human intelligence or internal security, and few citizens protest successes done on their behalf. Recent events, especially the leaks of Edward Snowden, brought signals intelligence into broader public attention. Many groups in Britain which were hostile to GCHQ used these leaks as an opportunity to assault it, unsuccessfully: public trust in GCHQ remained high. All of this encouraged GCHQ toward more openness. So, too, did a sense that its work was misunderstood and underappreciated, as well as the looming approach of its centenary year. For years, GCHQ had been releasing to The National Archives material on the Cold War, and was now willing to release a huge swathe more. Yet, given the experience during the 1990s of releasing records on sigint en masse from 1918-1945, GCHQ wondered how far these records would be read, or understood. They wanted an authorised history which would use these records to explain what GCHQ was and had done, and also to help to guide any interested person to understand what those documents said, so to make up their own minds on the matter. In order to do so, this history needed to be independent.

Any historian writing from privileged access to records faces questions about the independence or honesty of their account. When answering such criticisms, to some degree, they must rely on their reputation. In my case, the room for that sort of criticism is diminished, because most of the material I use soon will be in the public domain, but criticisms will be made. I already have heard some. There are many opinions on the legitimacy of government communications intelligence. Of course, anyone who opposes it root and branch will find room to criticise me, because I regard signals intelligence as a normal and acceptable practice of state, so long as the appropriate safeguards are maintained. I have conventional views on those safeguards: at home, or when dealing with their own citizens, signals intelligence agencies must follow constitutional and legal norms; abroad, or when dealing with foreign people or states, they can act quite freely, so long as they follow government policy and common sense. I regard all traffic of foreign governments (outside of the Five Eyes) and of entities hostile to us, as fair game.

I have complete freedom to write what I wish to say. I want to provide the best account I can of a topic which is important and not well understood. Signals intelligence is the most fascinating phenomenon I have ever addressed as an historian, linked to some of the greatest changes in human society of the past 75 years. I find GCHQ generally an able organisation, and at its best, the best intelligence agency I know of as an historian. Where GCHQ deserves praise, I will provide it. Yet for any historian of intelligence, to explain limits is as important as to explain power: in the end, intelligence is a secondary factor for a state, behind strength and strategy.

Moreover, no institution is perfect. If my history is to be any good, I must address GCHQ’s failures, and issues which it found or finds uncomfortable. During the 1930s British codemakers performed in a dismal fashion, which left Britain dangerously vulnerable during 1940. The upper echelons of British codebreaking caused that failure. GCHQ was obsessed with secrecy during the 1970s and 1980s. I will address controversial matters like the ABC trial and the union ban, and accusations that British officials broke the law in the use of communications intelligence. I will treat some events in ways which GCHQ probably will not like.
Though both GCHQ and NSA have an official “neither confirm nor deny” position on Edward Snowden, I will treat his disclosures as historical fact. After all, HMG has done so officially. These disclosures have affected the public politics around signals intelligence, and issues like oversight and translucency. As a military historian, moreover, I think that common opinion grossly overrates the importance of Bletchley Park and Ultra to allied success in the Second World War. I will say so, yet this belief provides some of the public force which supports GCHQ.

Interview conducted by Mark Stout on January 10, 2018.

Congratulations to Dr. Jeffrey G. Karam the recipient of the Christopher Andrew-Michael Handel Prize for best article published in the Journal of Intelligence and National Security. The article is titled “Missing Revolution: The American Intelligence Failure in Iraq in 1958.” It appeared in the October 2017 Issue.
Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Work Shop

Call for Paper Proposals

The Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project invites paper proposals for a one-day workshop on the history of Canadian foreign intelligence to be held at the University of Toronto on July 12, 2018.

Paper topics might include (but are not limited to):

- The management structures governing foreign intelligence in Canada
- The organizations involved in foreign intelligence collection and analysis in Canada
- The foreign intelligence products and assessments produced by these organizations and their impact on Canadian foreign and defence policy decisions
- The comparison of the Canadian foreign intelligence analytic structure and assessments with those of other countries, particularly Canada’s main intelligence allies

The Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project (CFIHP) seeks to encourage the study of the history of the foreign intelligence assessment function in Canada by facilitating the exchange of information among researchers and providing a forum for formal and informal collaboration through workshops and conferences.

Scholars interested in learning more about the Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project, including membership and its records database should visit https://carleton.ca/csids/canadian-foreign-intelligence-history-project/.

Please submit paper proposals (300 word maximum) and a CV to tim.sayle@utoronto.ca AND alan.barnes@rogers.com by March 1, 2018, and include “CFIHP” in the email subject line. Accepted papers will be pre-circulated so that all participants may read and comment on the papers at the workshop.
Intelligence historians were excited in June 2017 when, with very little fanfare, the State Department at last released the long-awaited “retrospective” volume in the Foreign Relations of the United States series on U.S. relations with Iran, 1951-54. The 1,007-page tome consisting of 375 documents from CIA, State Department, and National Security Council records promised to throw light on a subject notoriously neglected by the original 1989 FRUS volume on the subject: U.S. and British involvement in the 1953 coup that overthrew nationalist prime minister Mohammed Mosaddeq and restored the rule of the Shah.

Perhaps because the appearance of the second volume has been so delayed, expectations among historians were sky-high, and its contents have inevitably disappointed some. The overall emphasis of the collection is on analysis and policy discussions in the period leading up to the August 1953 overthrow of Mosaddeq, with relatively few operational records relating to the CIA’s role in the coup itself. At least nine CIA documents are explicitly identified as not having made it into the volume (helpfully, with full file location details) and many more feature numerous redactions. And thanks the U.K. government’s continuing official denial of any involvement in the coup, there are no records documenting the undoubted British contribution.

Still, given the previous dearth of official records concerning the CIA’s participation in the coup, the appearance of this volume is an important event for intelligence historians. The policy discussion documents show the leading part played by senior Agency officers Allen Dulles and Kermit Roosevelt in Washington’s decision to remove Mosaddeq. They also tend to confirm some historians’ view that the CIA’s intelligence analysts perceived the Iranian prime minister as less of a threat than its covert operatives. Finally, there are several revealing assessments of senior religious figures such as the Ayatollah Kashani who have been a focus of much recent historical debate about the authorship of the coup.

And there are some operational nuggets mixed in as well: extensive documentation of the CIA’s pre-coup anti-Mosaddeq operation, TPBEDAMN (for example, document 40); a CIA Tehran station post-mortem of the failed August 15 coup attempt (270) and the resulting telegram from headquarters instructing field personnel in Iran to stand down (278); and, perhaps best of all, a lengthy record of an August 28 meeting in Washington of CIA top-brass at which Kermit Roosevelt briefed his colleagues about events leading up to and during the successful coup of August 19.

The new FRUS volume doesn’t transform understanding of the historic events that took place in Iran in 1953; but it does provide valuable new information about the perspectives and actions of the senior CIA officers involved, and is welcome for that. Thanks should go to the many individuals and organizations in the historical community who have lobbied for its release for decades, such as the National Security Archive, who are currently in the process of filing FOIA requests for the CIA records that didn’t make the final cut.

Hugh Wilford, Professor of History, California State University, Long Beach

Please find the volume at:

https://history.state.gov/historical_documents/frus1951-
PODCASTS

The Bletchley Park Trust in the United Kingdom

https://www.bletchleypark.org.uk/news?page=1&category=podcasts

International Spy Museum in the United States has regular podcast series on intelligence history. They are available at:
• https://www.spymuseum.org/multimedia/spycast/

Spybray Podcast for fans of Spy/Espionage books and movies (available on iTunes)

Spies and Shadows – Podcasts of the UK intelligence/covert world (available on iTunes)

Intelligence Community Leaders are Readers - and Writers, Too

By P.J. Neal

Harry Truman famously said, “all leaders are readers.” In the Intelligence Community, they are writers, too. This bibliography, created as part of a larger research effort, includes all the book-length works written by heads of US Intelligence Community member organizations.

The list is long – 204 entries – and the topics covered are both impressive and diverse. They reflect the histories and focus areas of specific agencies, the careers and professional backgrounds of the individuals who led them, and the unique personal interests of authors who are, at the end of the day, human: Roger Hilsman, the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research from 1961 to 1963 wrote about nuclear issues and foreign relations, as well as a Chinese cooking. His successor, William Hyland (1974-1975) produced thoughtful works on US-Russian relations, as well as biographies of songwriters Richard Rodgers and George Gershwin. William Casey, the head of the Central Intelligence Agency from 1981 to 1987, wrote extensively about tax and legal issues, reflecting his long career as a corporate lawyer. Thomas Reed, who led the National Reconnaissance Office (1976-1977), is a novelist. The list goes on.

Any bibliography requires the editor to establish some subjective criteria for inclusion. Books by acting agency heads are included here, as are collections of speeches, but not reprints of individual remarks. It ignores book chapters, academic works, think tank reports, and government publications, and includes only English-language publications. Defunct organizations, such as the Black Chamber, are not included, and in situations where a single office within a larger agency is a member of the IC, but no office heads have written books, I have included those written by the overall agency heads (Department of Energy, Federal Bureau of Investigation). Lastly, three forthcoming books – from James Clapper, James Comey, and Michael Hayden – are included.

Taken in aggregate, the collective writings of these agency leaders is staggering in both breadth and depth. They provide insight into not only the challenges the United States has faced since its founding, but also on the individuals who serve our nation in and out of the spotlight.
Central Intelligence Agency

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (formerly known as Director of Central Intelligence)


---

Defense Intelligence Agency

**Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency**


——. _We Must Defend America: And Put an End to MADness_. Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1983.

---

Department of Energy

**Secretary of Energy**


**Director, Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence**

None

**Department of Homeland Security**

Secretary of Homeland Security


**Director of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis**

None

**Department of State**

Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (f/k/a, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research; Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence and Research)


**Department of the Treasury**

**Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence**


Kelly, R.W.. *Vigilance: My Life Serving America and Protecting Its Empire City*.


Kelly, R.W.. *Vigilance: My Life Serving America and Protecting Its Empire City*. 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Director of National Intelligence


Drug Enforcement Agency

Director, Drug Enforcement Agency

None

Director, Office of National Security Intelligence

None

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation


Executive Assistant Director, National Security Branch

None
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (f/k/a, Director, National Imagery and Mapping Agency)


National Reconnaissance Office
Director, National Reconnaissance Office


National Security Agency
Director, National Security Agency

Hayden, M.V.. *Playing to the Edge: American Intelligence in the Age of Terror*.

——. *The Assault on Intelligence: American National Security in an Age of Lies*.


——. *Commonwealth or Empire?: Russia, Central Asia and the Transcausasus*. Indianapolis, IN: Hudson Institute, 1995.


——. *Trial after Triumph: East Asia after the Cold War*. Indianapolis, IN: Hudson Institute, 1992.
**United States Air Force**

*Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (f/k/a Director of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance; Director of Intelligence)*


**United States Army**

*Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (f/k/a Military Intelligence Section; Military Intelligence Branch; Assistant Chief of Staff, Military Intelligence Division; Director of Military Intelligence Division; Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence; Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence)*


Odom, W.E.. *America’s Inadvertent Empire*.

——. *America’s Military Revolution: Strategy and Structure after the Cold War*.

——. *Commonwealth or Empire?: Russia, Central Asia and the Transcaucasus*.

——. *Fixing Intelligence: For a More Secure America*.

——. *On Internal War: American and Soviet Approaches to Third World Clients and Insurgents*.

——. *The Collapse of the Soviet Military*.

——. *The Soviet Volunteers: Modernization and Bureaucracy in a Public Mass Organization*.

——. *Trial after Triumph: East Asia after the Cold War*.


**United States Coast Guard**

*Assistant Commandant for Intelligence and Criminal Investigations*

None
United States Marine Corps

Marine Corps Director of Intelligence


United States Navy

Director of Naval Intelligence (f/k/a/, Chief Intelligence Officer)


———. Temperament, Disease, and Health. New York: G.P. Putman’s Sons, 1892.


———. The Dardanelles Expedition: A Condensed Study. Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1927.


———. The Fall of Maximilian’s Empire, as Seen from a United States Gun-Boat. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1887.


Thébaud, Leo Hewlett, ed. Naval Leadership: With Some Hints to Junior Officers and Others. Annapolis, MD: The United States Naval Institute, 1929.
United States War Department

Chief of Military Information Division


Board of Directors

President Mark Stout Ph.D. Mark is the Program Director for the Graduate Certificate in Intelligence at John Hopkins University. He is a former U.S. intelligence officer and former Historian of the International Spy Museum.

Vice President Sarah-Jane Corke Ph.D. As of July 1, 2018 Sarah-Jane will assume an associate professor of American History position at the University of New Brunswick. She is the author of US Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy: Truman Secret Warfare and the CIA, Routledge, 2008. She is now working on a biography of John Paton and Patricia Grady Davies.

John R. Ferris Ph.D. John is a professor of History at the University of Calgary. He is the author of Intelligence and Strategy, Routledge, 2001 and a number of other books on British strategic history. At the present time he is writing the authorized history of GCHQ.


Maria Robson is our graduate student representative. She is pursuing her Doctoral degree at Northeastern University, with a focus on security, intelligence, and international relations within Political Science. She holds a Master's in Military, Security, and Strategic Studies from the University of Calgary, Canada, where her thesis focused on Canadian signals intelligence sharing within the Five Eyes alliance. Maria holds a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations, Economics, and History from the University of Toronto, Canada. Her research on World War II signals intelligence has been published in the Journal of Intelligence History.

Maria currently works as a researcher at Northeastern's Global Resilience Institute and previously worked as a private sector Global Security Analyst in the energy industry.

Follow us on twitter
@SocIntelHist
Declassifications

National security lawyer Mark Zaid and his colleague Bradley Moss are representing four plaintiffs in a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit against the Central Intelligence Agency. The plaintiffs are former CIA officer Jeffrey Scudder, Dr. Kenneth Osgood, and two members of the NASIH board: Dr. Hugh Wilford and myself. The suit is intended to oblige the CIA to release nearly four hundred classified in-house histories. The lawsuit also challenges the Agency’s practice of refusing to provide electronic copies of declassified records.

So far, the CIA has released ten histories, one of them in two volumes. They are:

**DCI Series (Director of Central Intelligence)**


**MS Series (Miscellaneous Studies)**

**OBGI Series (Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence)**

**OC Series (Office of Communications)**

**OCI Series (Office of Current Intelligence)**

**OL Series (Office of Logistics)**


**OP Series (Office of Personnel)**


**Studies in Intelligence Articles**


These ten histories have come in two productions, one in November and one in December. Zaid, Moss, and the Government’s lawyer appeared before a judge on 3 January for a “status conference.” For the nonce, the Government will be making rolling productions every two months. The judge wasn’t willing to push them to do monthly production at the moment given the difficulty they are facing in locating some of these records, although he held open the option of reevaluating that decision later on. However, the Agency has a person whose primary responsibility is completing this FOIA request. The Agency also reassured the judge that the size of the rolling productions should be ramping up. The next production should comprise approximately 3,000 pages from thirty different histories. The two sides will file a joint status report to the judge in early April reporting on progress and any emerging problems.

Spot checks indicate that the histories declassified pursuant to this legal action have been posted in the CIA’s Freedom of Information Act Reading Room.


**HOME OF THE FIRST NASIH CONFERENCE IN 2020**